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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
The evolutions of geopolitics are exceptional but nevertheless ensure that events involve 
international relations.
1
 After the period of unpredictability following the 1971 failure of the 
Bretton Woods system of fixed international exchange rates, in terms of which exchange 
rates were tied to the price of gold, and the 1973 oil crisis, the need for a well co-ordinated 
multilateral trading system at the highest level became evident.
2
 
As a result, in 1974, after the first oil shock, an informal intergovernmental organisation 
namely G group (G5)
3
 was initiated with a series of meetings in Washington between the 
United States of America USA, Japan, France, West Germany and the United Kingdom. This 
group was replaced by the G6 with the addition of Italy. At the first summit of the G6, 
convened at the initiative of French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing at Rambouillet Castle 
in1975, the six leaders of the group of states agreed to meet annually, under a rotating 
presidency, to informally discuss economic and financial issues.
4
 
Following this period the G6 quickly became the G7 in 1976, with the inclusion of Canada. 
Since 1977, the European Union (EU) also participates as a guest. From 1994, the Russian 
Federation met regularly with representatives of the (G7). These meetings were referred to as 
the P8 (Political 8) or G7 +1, until Russia formally joined the group in 1997, giving birth to 
the current G8.
5
 The finance ministers and central bank governors of these countries have 
continued to meet to address the economic issues often in a G7 format.
6
 It is this „G7 
Finance‟ format that continues up to this day. Thus, since its inception, the G7 has been a 
                                                          
1
 Baracuhy B „The Geopolitics of Multilateralism: The WTO Doha Round Deadlock, the BRICs, and the 
Challenges of Institutionalised Power Transitions‟ (2012) 4 CRP 2. 
2
 Smith G „G7 to G8 to G20: Evolution in Global Governance‟ (2011) 6 CIGI Working Paper 4. 
The literature on the G8 and the G20 has become extensive in recent years. A historical summary of G8 
development can be found in Peter H, The G8 System and the G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation (2007). 
3
 Smith G „G7 to G8 to G20: Evolution in Global Governance‟ (2011) 6 CIGI Working Paper 4. 
4
 Smith G „G7 to G8 to G20: Evolution in Global Governance‟ (2011) 6 CIGI Working Paper 5. 
5
 Peter I „The G8 system and the G20: Evolution role documentation‟ (2007) Chap 2. 
6
 The summit of the G5 Finance Ministers Group was superseded by the G7 Finance Ministers Group set up by 
the 1986 Tokyo G7, Smith G „The Trilateral commission plenary meeting‟ April (2011). 
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meeting of leaders in order to discuss the economic affairs of the world. Because of the 
frequency and length of these meetings, the exchanges are characterised by openness, 
confidentiality and a lack of protocol.
7
 
In 1999, in reaction to the financial crisis that hit emerging markets in the late 1990s, the G20 
was formed. The G20 was originally designed for the finance ministers and governors of 
central banks of industrialised and emerging countries to informally gather yearly in order to 
facilitate international co-operation on economic matters. Through the involvement of the 
G20 the needs of developing countries became more prevalent in the multilateral trading 
system.
8
 The 1999 crisis prompted awareness of the importance of the effective integration of 
developing economies into global trade and the decision making process in the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). 
The G20 has become a prominent coalition group which plays an important role in the global 
economic sphere. The G20 group participates in the financial economy through the WTO and 
the Bretton Woods institutions, such as, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank.
9
 For example, during the Washington summit in November 2008, the Heads of 
State and government agreed on an exceptional joint action to prevent the collapse of the 
financial system and the global economy.
10
 This action was made through a combination of 
decision making procedures, such as, the Single Undertaking, Consensus and the Green 
Room process, following the principle of one member one vote. 
Presently, the G20 represents 85 per cent of the global economy and two-thirds (2/3) of the 
world population.
11
 It consists of the following members: 
 G7 members: Germany, Canada, USA, France, Italy, Japan and United Kingdom. 
 Australia. 
 11 emerging countries: South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Brazil, China, South 
Korea, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey. 
 The European Union. 
                                                          
7
 Peter I „The G8 system and the G20 evolution Role and Documentation‟ (2007) Chap 5. 
8
 Smith G „G7 to G8 to G20: Evolution in Global Governance‟ (2011) 6 CIGI Working Paper 5. 
9
  Zoellick R „Five Myths about the G-20‟ The Washington Post Oct 28 (2011) 5. 
10
 John E, Ramesh T& Andrew F „Reforming from the top: a leader‟s 20 summit‟ (2005) 144 United Nation. 
11
 Smith G „G7 to G8 to G20: Evolution in Global Governance‟ (2011) 6 CIGI Working Paper 6. 
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Developing countries
12
 have become progressively important in the G20 and in the WTO, 
and have demanded to be more active in the decision making process following the principle 
of sovereignty.
13
 In what follow, several arguments regarding the historical evolution of the 
G group will be address in the Chapter 3. 
Following the end of the Cold War, different trends were observed and the world went 
through major structural and geopolitical changes. Such changes were characterised by the 
rise of developing countries, such as, India and China,
14
 whilst major structural changes were 
also observed in services, manufacturing and in the agricultural sectors.
15
 These changes were 
due to the interaction of production in many industries in manufacturing, goods and services. 
Developing countries also began increasing their interest in the WTO of which their 
memberships now constitute two-thirds of the multilateral system.
16
 
As a result, many international summits, such as the Seattle Summit in 1999, the Uruguay 
Round (1986-1994) and the Doha Round (2001), have been arranged in response to different 
issues relating to international trade. One of the main challenges and the main objectives of 
the Doha Round was to reform the multilateral trading system in order to have a level playing 
field and to reflect a new balance of power and interests.
17
 The basic role of the WTO, as 
repeatedly stated, has been to provide a steady, predictable and conducive environment 
within which to conduct international trade through the activities of its dispute settlement 
body, the General Council (GC) and the biannual ministerial conferences. The discussion for 
more liberalisation and the updated agenda of the WTO only aim to reinforce this basic 
function.
18  
                                                          
12
 The term developing countries is wide, and is used differently depending on the situation. It is a term 
generally used to describe a nation with a low level of material well-being. 
13Schwanen D „The G20 Framework for strong, sustainable and balanced growth: A study in credible co-
operation‟ (2010) 4 CIGI Working Paper 6. 
14
At the geopolitical level, the 1990s were marked by the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the end of the Cold War 
and the demolition of the Berlin Wall which opened the way for the re-unification of Germany and the whole of 
Europe. These events accelerated the decline of the communist ideology and saw a large number of countries 
converting in liberalism. The People‟s Republic of China has opened up to international trade and foreign 
investment. This redefinition of the balance of power led to the emergence of globalisation, and the introduction 
of a new world economic order. 
15
 Medovic O,Lapardre L and Hopkins J „Structural change in the world economy: Main features and trends‟ 
(2009) united Nations Industrial Development Organisation Working Paper 24, 5-12. 
16
 Nalikar A & Tussie D „The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries and their Evolving in the 
WTO‟(2004) 947(7) The World Economy 951. 
17
 Laidi Z „The BRICS against the west?‟ (2011) CERI Strategy Papers 11, 5. 
18
 CSEND Policy Brief „The Doha stalemate: implication and ways forward‟(2011) Trade Policy Governance 5. 
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The Doha Round of trade development as well as the activities of newly formed groups, such 
as, the Cotton Four (C4) Group and the Non-Agricultural market Access (NAMA 11 ) Group, 
clearly show a rising awareness of the influence of developing and Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs)
19
 in recent years.
20
 A comprehensive analysis of the NAMA 11 and the C4 
Group will be discussed in chapter 3. However, since the WTO‟s commitment to deliver the 
promised pro-development changes the Doha Round has failed developing countries as these 
changes are yet to be realised. Furthermore, it is submitted that the political interest of global 
economy powers has been perform by developing countries. A number of developing 
countries, such as, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (commonly known as 
„BRICS‟ countries21), all characterised by fast growing developing economies have recently 
thus acquired a substantial influence in the international market and in the WTO.
22
 
These BRICS countries are making important changes in the decision making processes in 
the multilateral trading system. They became more important after the 1999 financial crisis.
23
 
They represent over 36 per cent
24
 of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The five new 
emergent countries play an incredible role in the new global economy, accounting for around 
40 per cent of the world population, and in 2015 they should achieve 61 per cent of global 
growth according to the IMF.
25
 They wish to increase their weight and better advance their 
views in economic negotiations, particularly in the forums of the IMF and the WTO. In 
                                                          
19
 The group of Least Developed Countries consists of: Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Solomon Islands, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritanie, Mozambique, Myanmar, Népal, Niger, Uganda, the 
Central African Republic, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Chad, Togo and Zambia. 
20
 Laidi Z „ The BRICS against the west?‟ (2011) CERI Strategy Papers 11, 4. 
21
 The term BRIC appeared for the first time in 2001 in a note from the United States bank Goldman Sachs to 
describe Brazil, Russia, India and China as economic powers called to challenge the dominance of rich countries 
in the multilateral trading system.  Goldman Sachs projected that BRIC economies could become as large as the 
G7 economies by 2032. With South Africa joining in April 2011, the term „BRICS‟ (Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa) has become a widely used symbol for the shifting of global economic power from developed 
economies to major developing countries. South Africa was able to join the BRIC group in 2011, despite its 
small population size relative to Brazil, Russia, India and China, through the efforts of the business community 
in South Africa and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The BRICS economic weight and growth contributions 
have risen gradually, and their equity markets have outperformed considerably regarding the multilateral trading 
system. 
22
 Qureshi Z „G20: the global growth and development agenda‟ (2010) (5) 31 International Organisation 
Research Journal 25 30. 
23
 Dhar B „BRICS in the emerging global economic architecture‟ (2012) SAIIA Working Paper No 125, 12. 
24
 See generally Armijo L „The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) as analytical category mirage 
of insight?‟ (2007) 31(4) Asian Perspective 7 14. 
25
 IMF External Relations Department „IMF Executive Board Approves Major Overhaul of Quotas and 
Governance‟ Press Release No10/418, Nov 2010 available at  
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10418.htm  (accessed 24 April 2013). 
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addition, these five countries are discussing the creation of their first institutions, including an 
investment bank to finance infrastructure projects and development.
26
  
The growing influence of BRICS in international negotiations relating to the WTO Doha 
Round, gives it real economic power in the global economy especially in low income 
countries.
27
 Thus, the role of BRICS in the multilateral trading system has gradually become 
important.  Its weight in the global economy continues to grow. It went from 16 per cent of 
world GDP in 2001 to 20 per cent this recent year.
28
 The world has witnessed the change 
caused by BRICS countries in the recent year considering this change as relevant technical 
and structural progress. This change is not solely with regard to trade and business markets 
but also as new emergent donors as well as providing technical assistance.
29
 They have 
established different ways of funding economic co-operation, particularly through south-
south co-operation with low income countries.
30
 The year 2011 showed a slow global 
economy balance tilting in favour of the bloc of emerging countries. Since their first summit 
in 2009, the leaders of the BRICS countries have sought to have more influence in world 
affairs, believing that their growing economic power must be taken into account.
31
 Therefore 
its will be interesting to know if developed countries still have a final word regarding the 
decision making process. 
 
1.2 Research problem 
 
In November 2001, the Doha Round of negotiations, under the auspices of the WTO, stalled 
for several months without any real prospect of continuing. This raised a series of 
uncertainties about the future of the multilateral trading system.
32
 The question of the role of 
                                                          
26
 Josie J „The BRICS development bank and publics infrastructure investment‟ (2013) HSRC Working Paper 1-
10.  
27Hawkswork J & Cookson G „The world in 2050: Beyond the BRICs: a broader look at emerging market 
growth prospects‟ (2008) Price water house Coopers 10. 
28
 See BRICS joint statistical publication 2013 available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/news_archive/Docs/FINAL_BRICS%20PUBLICATION_PRINT_23%20MARCH%
202013_Reworked.pdf (accessed 14 April 2013). 
29
 Memedovic O, Lapadre L and Hopkins J „Structural change in the world economy: Main features and trends‟ 
(2009) United Nations Industrial Development Organisation Working Paper 24, 7-16. 
30
 De Almeida P „The BRICS‟ role in the global economy‟ (2009) Trade and International Negotiations for 
Journalists 146 148.  
31
 De Almeida P „The Brics (2009) 146 150. 
32
 Cho S „The Demise of Development in the Doha Round‟ (2010) 31 International law journal.  
 
 
 
 
6 
 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) in relation to issues relating to the global economy 
and international trade has consequently arisen. 
The role of the WTO is central to international trade and aims to provide international co-
operation and economic development. However, it does not per se cater for all emergent 
countries‟ needs.33 This research submits that trade in developing countries can only flourish 
when more economic policies favour their trade. The coalition countries such as BRICS and 
the steps they have taken in putting forward an intergovernmental organisation framework, 
may offer the desired solution to these developing countries‟ trade needs. Evaluating whether 
the co-operation between these BRICS countries may help to build a more balanced 
multilateral trading system, improve global economy governance and promote democracy in 
international trade relations is therefore important. 
1.3 Research question  
 
This research is based on the premise that the BRICS group is a movement directed at the 
rebalancing power and wealth that may put an end to the domination of developed countries 
in the multilateral trading system. In order to effectively explore the role of BRICS in the 
further development of the multilateral trading system, this research poses the following 
questions: 
1- What is the legal and institutional framework of the BRICS group and how does this 
framework relate to the objectives of BRICS group? 
2- What is the interaction between the WTO and BRICS countries in the multilateral 
trading system? 
3- What is the position of BRICS countries in the decision making process in the 
multilateral trading system? 
 
1.4 Aims of the research 
 
This research assesses the rise of the BRICS group, in relation to the participation of 
developing countries within the WTO. It presents some aspects regarding the challenges and 
complications that developing countries face in their participation in the multilateral trading 
                                                          
33
 Armijo L „The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) as analytical category mirage of insight?‟ 
(2007) Asian Perspective 31,4. 
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system. The research further seeks to explore if this participation allows for more democratic 
development of the current multilateral trading system. 
 
1.5 Limitation of the study  
 
The research is confined to relevant legal provisions regarding the participation of the BRICS 
countries in the multilateral trading system. This study is also limited to the role of 
intergovernmental organisations in the WTO, in particular as it refers to the position of the 
BRICS countries in the further development of democratic decision making process within 
the multilateral trading system.  
1.6 Research Methodology  
This research is conducted by using sources, such as, academic books, journals, legislation, 
web publications, and reports from international trade conventions, with regard to the WTO 
Doha Round and the international economy relating to the WTO. The method employed in 
this research also requires the use of international trade law and trade policy instruments. 
This study analyses the evolution of the G7 to the G20; and the position of the alliance 
groupings in the WTO Doha Round, such as, the Cotton Four group (C4) and the (NAMA 
11) and BRICS as a new emergent power in the multilateral trading system. Additionally, the 
research considers the role of developing countries, which include BRICS and G 20 coalition 
countries, as agent in the reform of the multilateral trading system. The research also analyses 
how the decision making in the multilateral trading system has been seen by the developing 
countries. Finally there is an evaluation of some arguments concerning the raison for the 
proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and their place in the multilateral 
trading system.  
1.8 Overview of chapters 
 
Chapter two deals with trade policy, the WTO and the decision making process in the 
multilateral trading system. The chapter provides perspectives on of international trade policy 
in the multilateral trading system, the WTO‟s role in the multilateral trading system, and the 
decision making process in the world trade system.  
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Chapter three comprises and analyses the evolution of IGOs, such as the G20. This chapter 
provides a relatively broad overview of the history, structure and mode of operation of these 
groups of IGOs. The chapter points out some of the reasons why IGOs have been formed, the 
alliances countries have formed in the WTO negotiations, and what role they play in the 
WTO.  
Chapter four in particularly discusses the BRICS members and their position in the global 
economy. The chapter analyses the approach of BRICS countries in the multilateral trading 
system.  
Chapter five contain the conclusions and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TRADE POLICIES, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE DECISION MAKING 
PROCESS OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 
 
2.1 Perspectives on international trade policy in the multilateral trading system  
 
The policies of international trade consist of multilateral and bilateral arrangement between 
countries which provide recommendations for the regulation of regional and bilateral trade, 
policy and the harmonisation of trade between the countries involved. Trade policies are 
issues of high concern to developing countries because these policies dictate the terms on 
which these countries will be incorporated into the realm of international trade.
 34
 
The obligation and responsibility of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is to simplify the 
execution, administration, operation, and promotion of the objectives of the WTO 
Agreements within the multilateral trading system. It also provides the framework for the 
implementation, administration and operation of the multilateral trade agreements.
35
 
The WTO has its origins in the General Trade Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It 
was created as an umbrella institution to implement and negotiate the increasing number of 
international trade agreements that have been adopted in recent years.
36
 It was adopted at the 
Marrakesh Agreement as part of the final results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (MTN) on 15 April 1994 and came into force on 1 January 1995.
37
 The purpose 
of the Marrakesh Agreements was to facilitate the global economy and to provide the legal 
framework for world trade by opening more market access.  
Under the Marrakesh Agreement the WTO made the principle of non-discrimination a key 
concept of the WTO Agreement. There are two major principles of non-discrimination: the 
most favoured nation (MFN) rule, and the national treatment principle. These principles are 
rooted in the WTO rules on goods, services, and intellectual property. The MFN treatment 
obligation does not authorise a country to discriminate between countries.
38
 These principles 
                                                          
34
 Bossche P & Zdouc W The Law Policy of the World Trade Organisation 3ed (2013) 20. 
35
 Article III: 1 of WTO Agreement. 
36
 Ezeani E The WTO and its Development Obligation Prospects for Global trade (2011) chap 1 5. 
37
 Ezeani E (2011) chap 1 1. 
38
 Bossche P The Law policy of the World Trade Organisation: Text cases and Materials (2008) 321. 
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establish non-discrimination and openness in the international market among the countries 
involved by imposing more transparent measures to be adopted by member governments. 
39
 
The WTO operates via decision making processes contained in Articles IX and X of the 
WTO Marrakesh Agreement. It is imperative for the WTO to respond to the need of 
developing countries
40
 with regards to reciprocity in the multilateral trading system. The 
WTO decision making is the principal mechanism within the WTO to implement provisions. 
This chapter is thus subdivided into three sections. The first section discusses the WTO 
generally and provides some background information; the second section describes the 
institutional framework and decision making of the WTO; and the last section presents the 
conclusions. 
2.2 The World Trade Organisation’s role in the world economy  
 
The WTO rules fundamentally define what regions of economic activity may be challenged 
as being a barrier to the development of the free movement of trade or investment. Since its 
creation the WTO has played a leading role in the regulation of international trade between 
member states. Despite the controversy of the Seattle Summit and the failure of the Doha 
Round the WTO has none the less made several advances in areas, such as, agriculture, trade 
policies and the dismantling of trade barriers. Unfortunately the decision making processes of 
the WTO has not at all times reflected full democratic participation of all the member states. 
The international trading system rules established in 1947 by the GATT have resulted in a 
transparent trade regime and the progressive lower of tariffs to trade. Nevertheless, with the 
creation of the WTO, some rules were lengthy in order to contain those aspects that were not 
in the GATT system, such as, agriculture, textiles, trade in services, and intellectual property 
rights.
41
 Those efforts have been made due to the key concept of the WTO which is non-
discrimination with regards to law policies and national treatment. 
The changes made by the GATT to the WTO have brought many hopes and power especially 
to developing countries; in fact, the multilateral trading system was limited under the GATT, 
and no real trade connection was made between developed and developing countries, mostly 
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as regards decision making. It is true that in 1947, under the GATT, the contribution of 
developing countries to the global economy was not as important as today. The Seattle 
Summit in 1999 raised the capability of developing countries, particularly, India, China and 
Brazil, to contribute to global economic development, to reduce trade barriers, and to achieve 
prosperity in developed as well as developing countries.
42
  
The WTO is one of the three international organisations which deal with international trade 
among states and largely formulates and co-ordinates world economic policies.
43
 Its major 
roles in the global economy are: to elaborate the legal basis for management of the current 
trade barriers and for elimination of discrimination in international trade; and management of 
the process of multilateral trade negotiations and settlement of international disputes related 
to trade. In addition, the WTO supervises the trade policy of member states and co-operation 
with international organisations determining world economic policy.
44
 
Currently, the WTO has 159 member states
45
 which represent more than 95 per cent of 
international trade. The simplification and implementation thereof are the responsibilities of 
the WTO administration which seeks to achieve the objectives of the multilateral trade 
agreements.  
The WTO Ministerial Conference is its highest governing body, meets every two years, and 
mainly takes decisions on inter-state trade agreements. During the periods between 
conferences, the working of the WTO is handled by the General Council, which is 
accountable to the Ministerial Conference. The latest discussions relating to trade held by the 
WTO was the Doha Round (following the Uruguay Round in 1995) which had covered the 
wide range of trade issues by reducing trade barriers for agriculture.
46
 The decisions on co-
operation to reduce industrial tariffs and to establish discipline on the use of non-tariff 
barriers have been taken by WTO members at the Doha Round on Trade negotiations. The 
                                                          
42
 Bossche P & Zdouc W The Law Policy of the World Trade Organisation 3ed (2013) 31. 
43
 Matsushita M „Basic Principles of the WTO and the Role of Competition Policy‟ (2004) 3 Washihgton 
University Global. Study Law Review 363 385. 
44
 WTO 2013 available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (accessed on 27 August 
2013). 
45
 WTO 2013 available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (accessed on 27 
August 2013). 
46
 WTO‟s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, November 2001. 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
negotiations, such as, those on non-agricultural market access (NAMA), the introduction of 
lower trade barriers, and revised trade rules were also in the Doha ministerial declaration.
47
  
The major purpose of the Doha Round was to cut tariffs on industrial goods and remove non-
tariff barriers to market access of industrial exports. After 12 years, most of the decision 
making at the Doha Round has not been achieved by the WTO members. The extensiveness 
of the issues at the Doha Round has, however, made it difficult to assemble a package 
agreeable to all WTO members. The consensus relating to trade negotiation in the Doha 
Round did not materially address the reasonable interests of developed and developing 
countries which have made many efforts to be involved in the success of the decisions taken 
at the Doha Round.
48
 With regard to the inequality amongst States within the Doha Round, 
the WTO has failed to provide developing countries with democratic governance and 
decision making processes. Stiglitz has argued that the WTO policies have been set to serve 
the interests of developed countries over those of the developing countries. Reforming 
institutions, such as, the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, constitute a new step for 
developing countries because they argue that many of the existing WTO agreements are 
biased against their interests. According to Stiglitz:  
„The problem is not with globalisation, but with how it has been managed. Part of the 
problem lies with the international economic institutions, with the IMF, World Bank, and 
WTO, which help set the rules of the game. They have done so in ways that, all too often, 
have served the interests of the more advanced industrialised countries and particular interests 
within those countries rather than those of the developing world.‟49  
The WTO has allowed for preferential trade agreements (PTA) as an exception to the trade 
rules in terms of GATT Article XXIV. However, PTAs are sometimes seen as a form of 
discrimination during the decision making processes at the WTO. According to Khor, the 
major reason why the WTO has failed to reflect achievement apprehensions, despite the 
rhetoric in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, was the continuation of the non-participatory 
decision making process in which ministers, officials, ambassadors and diplomats from 
developing countries were not given the opportunity to take part in the key decisions, 
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especially during Ministerial Conferences and their preparatory process.
50
 Paragraph 4 of the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration adopted in Doha in 2001, provides the mandate for the 
negotiations, and states that the needs and interests of developing countries are at the heart of 
the Doha Development Agenda.
51
 
In this regard, Trakman argues that the lack of democratic system and the impasse at the 
negotiations in the WTO Doha Round of negotiation have advanced the proliferation of the 
multilateral trading system. He observes: 
„The most simplistic argument in favour of bilateral trade agreements is that, all other things 
being equal, bilateral trade agreements lead to there being more, and that having more is 
better than having less. States and their subjects that have more can buy and sell more. States 
can improve standards of living among their populace. They can extend economic benefits 
like social services, healthcare and education to the less fortunate. Having more allows them 
to share more.‟52  
This analysis is important for this research because most of the developing countries do not 
have a competitive economy in the international scene. Therefore, to be active in multilateral 
decision making processes will be a difficult task for them. Regional trade and bilateral trade 
agreements will help developing countries: first, to develop their economies; secondly, to be 
more active in their specific area; and, finally, to be more competitive in the multilateral 
trading system. It is true that BRICS countries are not party to a regional or PTA but these 
countries offer a corresponding positioned influence to that which is found in PTAs. 
Furthermore, the hindrance in the conclusion of the Doha Round has resulted in the 
proliferation of PTAs among countries.
53
 The more prominent PTAs include the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Community (EC), the Mercado 
Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) which includes Argentine Republic, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay, the ASEAN (Association of East South Asian Nations); and the Asian Free Trade 
Area (AFTA).  
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In some sense, the most important concern about PTAs is that they are, by definition, 
preferential and therefore discriminate against non-members. Dube argues that the seeming 
failure of the Doha Development Agenda is located in the decision making processes of the 
WTO.
54
 Reliance upon PTAs reflects the frustration that countries feel with the slow pace of 
decision making in the multilateral process. The divergent approaches between developed 
and developing countries on the substantive content of the latest negotiations, is a clear 
indication of this frustration.  
2.3 Fundamental principles and major policies of the World Trade Organisation 
 
The foundations of the multilateral trading system are based on the WTO Agreements. These 
apply to trade in goods, trade in services, and trade related aspects of intellectual property 
rights. The major principles of international trade are non-discrimination and the national 
treatment obligation.
55
 Additionally, transparency and special treatment for less developed 
members also form part of the basic principles of the WTO. Thus in paragraph 10 adopted in 
the Doha Ministerial declaration on 14 November 2001, members reaffirmed the importance 
of confirming internal transparency for all members.
56
 The WTO Agreements cover 
provisions giving developing countries special rights. Thus, there are around 145 WTO 
agreements called Special and Differential Treatment, and 107 of them were adopted at the 
Uruguay Round and 22 are applicable to Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
57
 Also, trade 
discussions and the implementation of negotiated trade rules form a basis of the fundamental 
principles. There are principally four major policies which underpin these rules, such as, 
assisting developing and transition economies; specialised help for export; the WTO in global 
economic policy making; transparency rules for keeping the WTO informed and transparency 
rules for keeping the public informed.
58
 In the case of special treatment for less developed 
members, the WTO agreements recognise the particular situation of developing and LDC 
countries by providing them with special treatment. The position of developing countries 
which demand more involvement in the multilateral trading system and the agreement of all 
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WTO members for decision making of all WTO members in respect of the WTO principles, 
have been the major impasses during the Uruguay and the Doha Rounds.  
2.4 Decision making procedure in the World Trade Organisation  
 
As indicated earlier, the WTO is one of the major international organisations in charge of 
regulating international trade among states.  It has been viewed as a democratic institution in 
international trade with respect to decision making based on consensus.
 59
 The WTO 
Agreement relating to the decision making process is regulated significantly by the provisions 
of Articles IX and X.
60
 Furthermore, provisions relating to decision making on disputes 
among members are contained in Annexure 2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU).
61
 The WTO Agreement also has some decision making procedures provided for 
under the GATT 1947.
62
  
The value of consensus was intended to improve developing countries‟ negotiating influence. 
If consensus cannot be reached, voting may be required.  However, in practice voting rarely 
occurs. The principle of „one member, one vote‟ is another foundational principle of decision 
making in the WTO.
63
 This is similar to the general principle of universal suffrage and related 
to all aspects of decision making within the WTO. The requirement of unanimity for 
amendments constitutes the rule relating to general principles, such as, MFN or national 
treatment. A three-quarter majority vote is required by WTO members to approve a decision 
for amendment.
64
 A two-thirds majority vote is appropriate for amendments with regard to 
issues other than the general principles mentioned above.  However, much criticism has been 
raised by developing countries regarding the decision making process of the WTO. They 
consider the WTO to be predominantly undemocratic and lacking transparency in the 
decision making process. 
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2.4.1 Decisions on various matters 
 
The foundation of the WTO decision making processes is stated in article IX: 1: 
 
„The WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under the 
GATT 1947. Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by 
consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting. At meeting of the Ministerial 
Conference and General Council, each Member of the WTO shall have a number of votes 
equal to number of their member States which are members of the WTO. Decisions of the 
Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast, 
unless otherwise provided in this Agreement or in the relevant Multilateral Trade 
Agreement.‟65 
 
In 1995 
66
 WTO members decided not to apply the provisions for „one member, one vote‟ in 
the case of accessions and requests for waivers, but to continue to proceed on the basis of 
consensus.
67
In fact, before the three-fourths majority voting procedure is used, the consensus 
procedure must first be used and it is only when consensus is not reached that the stated 
voting procedure is resorted to. Thus, the consensus procedure of the General Council 
decision with regard to the decision making process in the WTO under Articles IX and XII 
was adopted on 15 November 1995 and states: 
 
„On occasions when the General Council deals with matters related to requests for waivers or 
accessions to the WTO under Articles IX or XII of the WTO Agreement respectively, the 
General Council will seek a decision in accordance with Article IX: 1. Except as otherwise 
provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be 
decided by voting under the relevant provisions of Articles IX or XII.‟68 
 
However, it is suggested that despite the principle of one vote per member which is aimed at 
avoiding partiality, many developing countries have been pushed into decisions with which 
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they are not comfortable, for fear of holding up the proceedings and being criticised.
69
 It is, 
therefore, clear that the lack of full democratic participation between countries still remains. 
In this regard a British non-governmental organisation (NGO) fighting poverty in developing 
countries noted: 
 
„The current crisis in the WTO is rooted in the undemocratic nature of the organisation and 
the negotiations that take place within it. The image of the WTO as a democratic organisation 
is without foundation. From formulating the agenda to reaching a decision the process is 
dominated by the most powerful and richest countries. As such negotiation at the WTO is 
fertile ground for horse-trading that inevitable favour those with great financial and political 
might. To keep on top the massive agenda at the WTO, rich countries such as US, EU, Japan 
and Canada have large terms of well-resourced specialist in Geneva. Half of poorest countries 
in the WTO cannot afford one.‟70 
 
Despite these criticisms regarding the undemocratic decision making system in the WTO, 
developing countries have opted to develop PTAs in their specific areas. PTAs contribute to 
build regional and global liberalisation trade which can accelerate reform in the multilateral 
trading system. 
2.4.2 Decision making and movement towards preferential trade agreement 
 
As shown above, a key principle of the WTO is consensus, giving members the opportunity 
to negotiate and to work together on the basis of mutual understanding. However, it is often 
alleged that this decision making process is not always practical with regards to the equal 
participation of developing countries. Spoor argues that the interest of developing countries 
does not correspond with meaningful participation. He observes that: 
„Developments in the arrangement governing multilateral trade and technology transfers have left 
nations in the South more vulnerable than in the past. First the WTO negotiation process excludes 
countries in the south from meaningful participation, even though the WTO is based on the one country 
one vote principle. Second there is a greater reluctance at present to grant non reciprocal special and 
differential treatment to less-developed countries compared to thirty years ago. Third, WTO rules on 
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trade in intellectual property right (the so call TRIPS) are especially inimical towards the process of the 
technological diffusion in the south‟.71 
Special and differential treatment for developing countries should not be the only way of 
integration into international trade. The equal participation of all members is paramount to 
protect their interest. Raghavan, too, has criticised the trading relations between developed 
and developing countries when he argues that 
„...when a number of small economies refused to be manipulated, marginalised and left out of 
the decision-making processes and acquiesce in decisions cooked up in 'secretive' so-called 
'green room' processes; when some of the other major developing countries 'refused' to pay a 
price to enable the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters and the US to gain concessions 
from the EC on the agricultural front; and.; when developing nations refused to be cowed - by 
some of the street protests and by the US administration - and said 'no' to labour and 
environmental standards being linked to trade rights and obligations and open to 'sanctions'.‟72  
Since the Seattle Summit in 1999
73
, there has been an increase in the use of informal decision 
making mechanisms, especially amongst developing countries. Many developing countries 
feel that they are not involved in the WTO Agreements due to their lack of effective 
participation. Also, they recognise that they have limited power in the multilateral trading 
system where recent progress (Seattle and Doha Rounds) on trade and investment 
liberalisation is perceived to have been excessively slow. Many small economies have 
underscored the need to consciously explore alternative means of participation.
74
 The 
requirement of developing countries, is to have a voice in the decision making process.  
Currently, developing countries participate more in the decision making process where their 
trading needs can be protected under PTAs.
75
 The movement toward PTAs has changed the 
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architecture of participation in the multilateral trading system. These alliances have 
demonstrated the capacity to influence the agenda of negotiation, most noticeable in the 
agriculture negotiation during the Doha Round.
 76
 The issue of coalition has significantly 
changed the institutional dynamic of the decision making process in the multilateral trading 
system. Countries, such as, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), have 
changed the power relation in international affairs. While the Unites States and the EU 
maintains their superpower status, their position is increasingly being challenged in the world 
sphere by the BRICS countries.
77
 These countries have clearly increased their influence and 
are demanding a larger role in the decision making processes. 
The WTO Secretariat encouraged the inclusion of such coalitions in the decision making 
processes.
78
 These coalitions are an integral part of the multilateral trading negotiations.
79
 
Although member states have been adapting the means by which they participate in the 
WTO, insufficient attention has been given to these shifts. It is often alleged that the decision 
making processes in the current multilateral trading system are not reasonable with regards to 
the equal participation of developing countries. The major reason that accounted for 
developing countries‟ participation was the non-reciprocity requirement, as discussed above, 
to develop trade which in can benefit developing countries. Spoor argues that the interest of 
developing countries does not fit with the non-reciprocity principle. He in particular 
observes: 
„Developments in the arrangement governing multilateral trade and technology transfers have left 
nations in the South more vulnerable than in the past. First the WTO negotiation process excludes 
countries in the south from meaningful participation, even though the WTO is based on the one country 
one vote principle. Second there is a greater reluctance at present to grant non reciprocal special and 
differential treatment to less-developed countries compared to thirty years ago. Third, WTO rules on 
trade in intellectual property right (the so call TRIPS) are especially inimical towards the process of the 
technological diffusion in the south‟.80 
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Thus, special and differential treatment for developing countries could not only be a 
guarantee of their integration into, and interest in, international trade, but also of their 
participation in the multilateral trading system primarily to protect their own interest. 
Currently, developing countries participate more in the decision making process when their 
trading needs can be protected under the multilateral trading system order.
81
 
Countries, such as, China, India and Brazil, have changing power dynamics in international 
affairs with regards to bilateral and regional trade agreements. While the Unites States and 
the EU maintain their superpower status, it is increasingly being challenged in the world 
sphere by the BRICS members, such as China, India and India. The developing countries 
(BRICS countries) have increased their influence and are demanding a larger role in the 
decision making processes. 
2.4.3 WTO decision making process: the Green Room process 
 
As shown above, the involvement of developing countries in the WTO decision making 
process is changing the way in which consensus is reached. In particular the Green Room 
process has caused the developing countries to complain that their views are not reflected in 
the decision making process.
82
 The Green Room started in the GATT 1947 period and is still 
used minimally in the current WTO decision making process; however, it is not provided for 
in the WTO Agreement and is said to exclude many developing countries.  
The anomaly of the Green Room, which is seen to be discriminatory by developing countries, 
is the fact that participation in the Green Room meetings is strictly by invitation.
83
 The partial 
participation by developing countries has raised the question of a non-democratic system in 
the organisation. However, developed countries have made recommendations. These accord 
the developed countries a greater voice based on the assumption that they have more 
influence in international trade. In this regard, the right to effective participation in 
international trade has been accorded to certain countries taking into consideration their 
economic weight and their population demographic. However, the WTO policies eventually 
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have an effect on all people. Jacobs explains that the WTO‟s culture on consensus is 
misleading. He underlines that:  
„Consensus means that states have a veto right on any decision, suggesting that the WTO is a 
strong confederation. But the reality is not so commendable. Each state‟s real veto capacity is 
directly proportional to its weight in world trade. The US, the European Union and Japan 
have the capacity to veto anything at the WTO, even though their negotiating positions can be 
severely affected by intransigence. That is because these three markets are so big that 
secession by any one of them would create huge competitive imbalances that global business 
could not tolerate. Votes do not take place at the WTO because if, say, the US were put in 
minority on a treaty amendment, she would secede and the WTO would collapse….By 
contrast, “if small economies” were to reject treaty amendments, global business would not be 
overly disturbed and the WTO would move on, possibly expelling dissenting states in order to 
maintain the discipline that underpins its success. (Such scenarios are rarely mentioned 
publicly, but they are the big elephant in the middle of the WTO‟s negotiating room.) Hence, 
when a round of WTO negotiations comes to an end and it is clear that most states support a 
proposed deal, each Quad member faces two alternatives: accept the new deal or impose the 
status quo on everybody. The alternatives faced by any individual developing country are 
quite different: accept the new deal or be prepared to be pushed out of the WTO.‟ 84 
However, despite this argument, Jacobs‟s point of view is limited to developed countries in 
terms of their economic weight in world trade. He does not outline the power of developing 
countries, such as, the BRICS group. It is suggested that these emerging countries should 
have the capacity to veto anything at the WTO. If the principle of the economic weight and 
population demographic is one of the major principles to be used BRICS members, such as 
China India and Brazil, should have an automatic seat in the Green Room and in the 
multilateral trading system negotiation at all because there are huge and competitive in the 
world market. The next section will examine the proliferation of PTAs due to the 
undemocratic and impartiality system in the WTO. 
2.5 The WTO decision making process: developing countries and the proliferation of 
preferential trade agreements 
 
A history of international trade among states under the GATT and the WTO has determined 
the method of negotiation among countries in the WTO‟s decision making process. 
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Throughout this period, the GATT was viewed by developing countries as an institution of 
rich countries.
85
 Developing countries found that the principle of non-discrimination in 
GATT Articles II and XVII and non-democratic participation in trade relation were 
inequitable to their interests.
86
  Paragraph 4 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration adopted in 
Doha in 2001, provides the mandate for the negotiations of the Doha Round, and states that 
the needs and interests of developing countries are at the heart of the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA). Nonetheless, developing countries have made use of Article XXIV of the 
GATT to enter into PTAs as a forum to better address their interests. 
The limited participation of developing countries in the WTO negotiations has influenced 
them to make use of PTAs as a means of securing involvement in the WTO negotiations. 
Developing countries, therefore, are entering into PTAs to enhance their positions within 
their own regions as well as in the multilateral level.  
As a result PTAs are on the increase in the multilateral trading system. This proliferation is 
not only as a result of the benefit of enhanced participation in the multilateral level.  
Developing Countries have benefitted in other ways as well.  These benefits are evident in the 
success of MERCOSUR
87
 as well as NAFTA. Thus a large number of PTAs has now 
emerged as a critical element of the consensus process in the multilateral trading system.
88
  
The major challenge of the WTO is to reflect an agenda where all members can live well and 
within the means of the world. This has developed into one of the most pressing problems 
within the global trading system. The decision making process in the WTO should in the 
future take into account the position of all WTO members especially the developing ones. 
Currently, PTAs play an important role in the multilateral trading system. Developing 
countries see PTAs as a way to attempt closer relations with other regional groupings in the 
multilateral trading system. 
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2.6 Conclusion  
 
As discussed above, the decision making process is not an easy task having regard to the 
principle of consensus and the issues of legitimacy in the WTO. The interesting hypothesis 
relating to the decision making process is that the process attempted to provide a better 
framework for the future but its form has not yet been achieved. Decision making is the result 
of essential principles at the heart of the trade system.  
This chapter has highlighted the WTO rules and the partial participation of the developing 
countries in the WTO decision making process. It has shown the proliferation of PTAs and 
that this construct has been an important development in the governance of the WTO. In 
reforming the WTO decision making process, the WTO Agreement does not in any way 
create a problem as members can resort to decision making solely by consensus. Decision 
making has brought a change to the global economy under the WTO order. In contrast to the 
fundamental principle of the WTO system, namely, consensus, one member one vote, the 
WTO has slowly progressed with this method in applying the international law principle of 
sovereign equality with respect to legitimacy in the WTO. In fact, the WTO is the only IGO 
where all countries members have the same power and authority. Although all of these 
principles are applicable in theory, in practice its does not seems to be so. 
The consensus building process has currently emerged as a critical element of coalition 
building due to the exclusion of the majority of the developing countries from the informal 
consensus building decision making processes in the WTO. While the coalition of developing 
countries was disheartening and seen as a threat to the trading system under the GATT, the 
WTO Secretariat has deliberately moved to include coalitions in decision making processes 
by recognising their function as representatives of countries‟ constituencies. Sovereign 
equality is seen as restricted by the unequal weight of countries in decision making. 
Nevertheless, the countries that agree to organisations that practise weighted voting do so as a 
legitimate expression of their sovereignty.  
Developing countries, such as, the BRICS group, will not recognise any decision made 
without their  involvement in the WTO decision making process in the further development 
of the system as it was in the GATT period. BRICS countries are progressively interested in 
having a greater impact on the international decision making process. Managing the influence 
of these emerging powers and reforming global institutions will become significant issues for 
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a future effective global governance system. Decision making is still undemocratic, a fact of 
which the conflict between the principle of equality of sovereignty and the reality is evidence.  
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CHAPETR 3 
THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 
IN THE CURRENT MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 
 
3.1 Historical background and theoretical basis of intergovernmental organisations 
 
An international organisation (IO) is an institution drawing membership by a formal 
agreement or treaty which is designed to achieve a common objective or multiple interests, 
such as, political, economic, environmental and social ones.
89
 Membership of an IO can 
include States, namely, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) as well as, non-states 
namely, non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
90
 However, IGOs range in size depending 
on their geographic area of jurisdiction, such as, the European Union (EU), the African Union 
(AU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), and the United Nations (UN). Their organisational framework can be 
simple or highly complex depending on their size and responsibilities. The purpose of the 
increase in IOs such as IGOs is to have a neutral forum where countries can participate and 
discuss the problems that have been significant all over the world, for example the Uruguay 
and Doha Rounds negotiations. This increase has been significant in the multilateral trading 
system, especially after the deferral of the Uruguay and Doha Rounds negotiations. 
IGOs also serve suitable purposes for individual states, which often use them as instruments 
of foreign policy to legitimate their actions and to force change in the behaviour of other 
states.
91
 Wallace and Singer argued that these organisations are the emanation of members‟ 
states and therefore only have the powers granted by them under international treaties or 
agreements.
92
  In the absence of treaties or agreements the IGO does not exist in the legal 
sense.  
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NGOs, nevertheless, are principally suitable for organising public support, monitoring the 
effectiveness of international aid, and providing information and expertise. They play an 
important role in international relations.
93
  
Originally, the principal aims of IGOs were to create a mechanism for the world's inhabitants 
to work more positively together in the areas of peace and security and also to deal with 
economic questions relating to the multilateral trading system.
94
 In the current era of 
increasing globalisation and interdependence of nations, IGOs have come to play a very 
significant role in the international trade system and global governance. IGOs have facilitated 
progress of the conduct codes for corporations and international treaties.
95
 It is important to 
note that IGOs give legitimacy to undertakings in the manner that a state acting alone cannot. 
The EU and the WTO reflect the most characteristic quality of an IGO in that IGOs are 
constructed by states to facilitate co-operation. The main effectiveness of IGOs lies in 
providing states with a forum which they can use to negotiate conflicts. IGOs are also useful 
to states in a number of other ways, such as: 
 Providing a forum for discussion. They make it less costly for states to discuss issues 
with one another. 
 Serve as information providers. The enhanced transparency helps to minimise 
misperceptions. 
 Support and facilitate issue linkages, which may facilitate co-operation. 
 Allow states to take a long term perspective, which makes them less concerned about 
immediate pay-offs.
96
 
Nevertheless, there are specific state alliances created in recent years which have demanded 
more democracy in the multilateral trading system. Most of these associations do not have 
any treaty or legal agreement but are seen in international affairs as IGOs because they play 
significant roles in the international trade market and often adopt positions to defend their 
interests. Example of IGOs recently created include the BRICS coalition (Brazil, Russia, 
                                                          
93
 Wallace M & Singer D „Intergovernmental organisation in the global system, 1815–1964: A quantitative 
description‟ (2007) 24 International Organisation 247. 
94
 Boehmer C, Gartzke E & Nordstrom T „Do intergovernmental organisations promote peace?‟(2004) 57 World 
Politics 1 2.  
95
 Wallace M & Singer D „Intergovernmental organisation in the global system, 1815–1964: A quantitative 
description‟ (2007) 24 International Organisation 246. 
96
 Brahm E „Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)‟ available at 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/role-igo (accessed 17 October 2013). 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
India, China and South Africa), the Cotton Four Group (C4) (Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and 
Chad), the Non-Agriculture Market Access Group (NAMA11) and the G Group Coalition.
97
 
The growth of large trading blocs has underscored both regional and international 
interdependence, although it has also stimulated and institutionalised rivalries between 
different blocs, such as, developed and developing countries, in the WTO decision making 
process.
98
 A particular problem is posed when such coalition states take a position, and when 
a change of their share in the global economy generates variations and influences the 
international decision making framework.  
This chapter will focus on the evolution of the G Group which plays an important role in the 
global trade system, and BRICS group which is seen as a new economic power in the 
multilateral trading system. The chapter also assesses the inclusion of the C4 Group and 
NAMA11,
99
 formed by least developing countries in the WTO Doha Round. The chapter is 
divided into three sections. The first explores the historical evolution of the G Group, and 
seeks to provide an understanding of the reason why the G Group was formed. Following this 
section, the chapter outlines the contribution of role of coalition groups, such as, the 
NAMA11, and C4 Group at the WTO negotiations supported by the at least one of the 
BRICS members. The second section considers the importance of the BRICS countries in the 
current multilateral trading system, and examines the areas in which BRICS can make a 
difference in the multilateral trading system with regard to the WTO rules. The final section 
provides concluding observations. 
3.2 Historical evolution of the G Group 
 
The existence of a global economic crisis in 1970 and the degree of economic 
interdependence between the developed countries was so high that the solution to the crisis 
was through international co-operation by the creation of institutions, such as, the IMF, the 
World Bank, the WTO and the G Group.
100
 Constant through the entire process that led to the 
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G20, was  the word „crisis‟, which appeared on the agenda at the first informal G5 meetings 
organised in the early 1970s. These meetings were held in a very specific context, marked by 
the crisis. In 1975, these meetings formalised at the level of Heads of State and became the 
first G6 with the addition of Italy, and the G7 in 1976, with the entry of Canada. Russia 
participated in some of the meetings with the G7 leaders in the early 1990s, and officially 
joined the group in 1997; the G7 therefore became the G8.
101
 These groups were established 
to discuss world affairs honestly and without protocol, in a relaxed and informal atmosphere.  
Furthermore, the intention was to have meetings for good governance and to provide a forum 
for consultation and decision making in the multilateral trading system.
102
 
In 1999 the informal coalition group of developing countries was formed. The G20 was 
established to promote growth and economic development in the global economy.
103
  The 
G20 is a forum for the political leaders of the world‟s most advanced and emerging 
economies and a representative from the EU.
104
 Collectively, the G20 members are estimated 
to contribute around 80 per cent of the world‟s Gross National Product (GNP) and represent 
80 per cent of world trade and two-thirds of the world‟s population. The G20 was originally 
intended to be an annual informal meeting of finance ministers and governors of central 
banks of industrialised and emerging countries to facilitate international co-operation in 
multilateral trading system matters. Following the economic crisis in 2000, the G20 has 
become an important forum for economic and financial co-operation.
 105
  
In 2013, the G20 summit at Saint Petersburg provided a framework for sustainable stability 
development and co-operation. The consolidation of this framework has attained some 
objectives for alliance in international trade system because the policy has been 
institutionalised.
106
One of the elements of this framework is the reform of the multilateral 
trading system to promote the Agenda of trade and financial matters. Global development 
however, has undergone many difficulties after the economic crisis in 1999, and the 
sustainability of this development has not re-balanced world demand as yet. The strategy 
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undertaken by the G20 framework draws upon the lessons learned from the multilateral 
negotiation of the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank.
107
 
 3.3 The NAMA 11 Group  
 
The Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003 has 
become memorable due to the coalition of countries in relation to agriculture.
108
 NAMA-11 
was formed at the 6th WTO Doha Round of the multilateral trading system at the Hong Kong 
ministerial meeting. Nevertheless, during the period of the Hong Kong ministerial meeting, 
the NAMA-11 coalition has developed as an important group in the negotiations of the Doha 
Round on industrial tariffs (non-agricultural market access), as well as with regard to the role 
played by the G20 in the Doha Round on agriculture negotiations.
109
 This coalition has 
provided a rational response to the problem of unequal negotiating power in the WTO with 
regard to market access in the industrial sector. Furthermore, BRICS members are actively 
involved in protecting and participating as negotiators for the LDCs countries based on the 
need for developing countries to advance the liberalisation and reform of agriculture in the 
developed world, with concerns for social justice and development in developing 
countries
110
. The contribution, of new emergent countries in the WTO negotiations is, 
therefore, not only in their own interest but also for the LDCs for good governance in the 
multilateral trading system, and particularly in respect of agricultural negotiations.  
Therefore, it appears that a coefficient of tariff reduction of 10 would lead to an average 
reduction of 21 per cent for the US and 23 per cent for the EU, while a coefficient of tariff 
reduction of 20 would imply a reduction of 58 per cent for Brazil, 62 per cent for India, 42 
per cent for South Africa and 28 per cent for China. The average bound rate would be 
reduced from 46.6 per cent to 13 per cent for India, from 29.8 per cent to 11.7 per cent for 
Brazil, 9 per cent 5.6 per cent for China, and 19 per cent to 8.8 per cent for South Africa. 
Even a factor of 35 reduces the bound tariff rates in most developing countries more than in 
developed ones (45 per cent for Brazil, 52 per cent for India, and 32 per cent for South 
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Africa, country for example).
111
 The reduction rate applied is lower (except for China) due to 
excessively high tariffs in developing countries. The proposed coefficients for developing 
countries impose a rate reduction two to three times higher than in developed countries.
112
 
The NAMA-11 Group argued that the tariff lines should be revised upwards because the 
conditions limit flexibility. The important point of the NAMA-11 discussion was in 
paragraph 24 of the Ministerial Declaration.
113
 To profoundly respect the instruction 
reciprocity in the multilateral trading system, a differential coefficient has been projected for 
all Doha Round participants. This coefficient has been calculated by the NAMA-11 Group to 
an average cut of 25 per cent for developed countries and an average cut of 65 per cent to 70 
per cent for developing countries.
114
 
3.4 Market access for developing countries and Least Developing Countries at Doha. 
 
The objective to achieve market access in the multilateral trading system was one of the main 
arguments of the WTO Doha Round negotiations.
115
 The aim was to establish a more 
coherent product which would better respond to the specific needs of the beneficiaries of 
trade. It is true that the Doha cycle, unlike successive GATT Rounds has involved real 
negotiations on agriculture. However, the opening of markets to trade in services, and a 
review of trade facilitation, were persisted with in the Singapore negotiations.
116
 This 
complexity is offset today by greater diversity of countries involved in the negotiations, since 
developing countries and economic groups in transition are now taking a more active role, 
such as the BRICS countries, the NAMA 11, and the Cotton Four. The variety of actors is no 
doubt greater than during the Uruguay Round, and the G20. This plays a key role in 
supporting developing countries, especially in the field of agriculture.
117
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Although the objectives of the Doha Round seem to depend primarily on the overall capacity 
of the US and the EU to agree in advance, it is significant that the real engine of the 
negotiations, despite some delays, was the new Quad composed of the US, the EU, BRICS 
members (such as, India and Brazil), and supplemented on occasion by Australia, with whom 
they formed the group of five interested parties.
118
 This negotiation, which includes the EU, 
the US, Brazil and India, has played a key role on the agenda on the direction of negotiations. 
In Hong Kong, the main objective was to save the WTO. Thus, the role of Brazil and India as 
BRICS members was to obtain the consent of the developing countries to an unfair agreement 
that would make it possible, given the reluctance of the EU and the US to make substantial 
concessions in agriculture, for a good trade balance in the multilateral trading system.
119
 
Through this stage of development, there was a lack of explicit re-affirmation of the need to 
conclude the cycle for the year 2010 (as was the case for the G8 Summit in L'Aquila in July 
2009).  Otherwise, in consideration of a new deadline, the WTO Director General, Pascal 
Lamy, mentioned the desire to start assembling all the tricks of negotiations to make it easier 
for all WTO members.
120
 
Under the approach as presented in March 2010 by Lamy at a meeting of the Trade 
Negotiations Committee (TNC), three ingredients describe the process of consultations and 
meetings held by the Presidents regarding the negotiating issues: first, consultation with the 
Director General Groups (grouping of interests in which different member States are 
represented); secondly, meetings of the TNC to maintain transparency; and thirdly, inclusion 
and organisation of meetings by members in various forms and configurations.
121
 In addition, 
the enlarged meeting supported by the EU and India (including, in addition to these  
members, Australia, Argentina, Canada, Egypt, Japan and Mexico, the C4 represented by 
Burkina Faso, agricultural G20 represented by Brazil, G33 represented by Indonesia, G10 
represented by Switzerland, NAMA-11 represented by South Africa, the LDC group 
represented by Zambia, the African Group, represented by Gabon, the ACP Group 
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represented by Mauritius, and small vulnerable economies represented by Barbados) and a 
ministerial meeting on the side-lines of a major event of the OECD, with the participation of 
South Africa, China, India and Brazil as participants (May 2010), have amply demonstrated 
the position of developing countries on the issue of agriculture (mainly cotton and NAMA) in 
the negotiations of the Doha Round.
122
 Twenty-five of the thirty one 31 LDCs that are 
members of the WTO come from Sub- Saharan Africa. This means that the support of BRICS 
countries is important in the WTO negotiations because BRICS creates a crucial balance 
between developing countries and developed countries. 
3.5 The Cotton 4 Group 
 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad are the four signatories of a proposal for a sectorial 
initiative in favour of cotton, filed on 30 April 2003 at the WTO on behalf of all producing 
countries in West and Central Africa.
123
  
This innovative initiative provided a focal point at the ministerial meeting of the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), and required the commitment of member 
countries of the WTO to gradually reduce subsidies to cotton farmers in developed countries. 
Regarding the implementation schedules for local farm subsidies to ensure the survival of 
their industry, the African initiative called for emergency, financial compensation for loss of 
income.
 124
  In this regard see, for example, the dispute between of Brazil against the US with 
regard to cotton. According to the cotton development negotiation, the C4 Group regretted 
that there had been no progress in the talks; and they wanted improved assistance with more 
focus on their cotton.
 
 
With regard to this lack of negotiation on cotton, the C4 Group has proposed less trade and 
reform of the domestic subsidies policies.  
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3.5.1 Cotton 4 Group proposals at the Doha Round 
 
On 16 February 2006 the C4 group was the author of a sectorial initiative on cotton in the 
WTO negotiation.
125
 West and Central Africa countries have undertaken internal market 
reforms in order to make their individual cotton sectors more competitive in the multilateral 
trading system; however, these reforms have been practically invalidated by the subsidies 
given by other WTO members to cotton farmers.
126
 The C4 Group indicated higher 
percentages of reduction of all domestic support which distorts trade, which includes the 
Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS), de minimis support and the blue box that should 
apply to the cotton reduction rate which would differ in different countries,
127
 as follows: 
 
General reduction rate Cotton reduction rate Differential rate 
60 per cent 82.2 per cent 22.2 per cent 
70 per cent 84.3 per cent 14.3 per cent 
80 per cent 88.3 per cent 8.3 per cent 
90 per cent 93.7 per cent 3.7 per cent 
100 per cent 100 per cent 0 per cent 
Source: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) 2008.  
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However, there is no doubt that, in the spirit of the C4 Group and many WTO members, the 
question of the reduction of domestic support for cotton, as suggested in paragraph 11 of the 
Declaration of Hong Kong Ministerial Decision,
128
 where members had agreed on the 
objective of negotiations, internal of the cotton production. Nevertheless, paragraph 4 of the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration
129
 stated that it falls within the mandate of the framework 
agreement of 1 August 2004. The members re-affirmed their commitment to ensure a high 
priority for cotton and to establish procedures that fully comply with the terms of the August 
2004 Decision.
130
 
African mobilisation of the cotton issue in Hong Kong was the continuation of a process that 
began nearly three years earlier with the submission of the sectorial initiative in favour of 
cotton by the C4 Group. In Hong Kong, the C4 Group, supported by whole process of 
lobbying for trade liberalisation in cotton in particular the BRICS countries, called for timely 
regarding the demand of poverty reduction that has been stalled in Cancun Ministerial 
Declaration.
131
 However, if the capacity of African countries in negotiations has undoubtedly 
strengthened, the results are diverse. They have been successful with regard to some matters, 
such as, elimination of export subsidies and access without duties or quotas for LDCs 
cotton.
132
 On this latter point, it is noted that it is likely that this represents a very significant 
benefit compared to the current situation, because cotton growing markets are located in most 
developing countries and in particular in China and India.  
This strong pressure from African countries C4 Group and the support from BRICS countries 
resulted in developed countries making the following proposals for the cotton sector: 
 The elimination of export subsidies for cotton in 2006; 
 Access without tariffs or quotas to LDC cotton markets of developed countries; 
 A decrease of internal support to the cotton sector in developed countries; and finally, 
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 A call for increased international aid to the African cotton sector, designed to increase 
its competitiveness.
133
 
3.6 The BRICS Group 
 
The term „BRICS countries‟ initially came from the acronym BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China). The idea of BRIC was created by Goldman Sachs.
134
 It was pointed out that 
BRIC would play an increasingly important role in the global economy over the next 50 years 
and it was argued that the economies of the BRIC countries could be a major force in the 
global economy by 2050. The four countries started to meet as a coalition which shares 
similar interests in 2006. After their first summit on 16 June 2009 in Yekaterinburg,
135
 
Russia, the four countries called for a world based on the rule of international law, fairness, 
reciprocity, support, co-ordinated action, and collective decision making of all members. It 
was only in 2010 that South Africa was invited to join the group, which has expanded the 
acronym to BRICS.
136
 
The chief influence of BRICS in international trade is due to their demographic and strategic 
geographic sizes, principally in Low Income Countries.  Currently, amongst the BRICS 
countries the aim is to gain more influence in the multilateral trading system. The possible 
creation of their own system of national currency loans for payments seems a positive step 
for the further development to reducing the dependency on the two global reserve currencies, 
the US dollar and the Euro. The BRICS countries seek to build co-operation that is able to 
challenge the global market. Additionally, they are also committed to advance the reform of 
international financial institutions, so as to reflect changes in the global economy.
137
 
The BRICS countries have indeed influenced the framework of the multilateral trading 
system.
138
 For example, in the WTO Doha Round, the Cotton Four Group and NAMA11 
received the support of BRICS members, such as, Brazil, China and India, regarding the 
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patent regime and access to medicines, agriculture, and non-agricultural market access.
139
 At 
the WTO, all three have major trading interests: Brazil in agriculture, China in 
manufacturing, and India in services.
140
 
Also, their framework to launch a Development Bank, with the objective to reduce the 
group‟s dependence on the Bretton Woods institutions, such as, the IMF and the World Bank, 
is seen as an important step in the multilateral trading system.
141
 The BRICS framework 
constitutes a key for the evolution of their recent economic dynamism and growing economic 
capacity.
142
 This construction follows the idea of South-South-Co-operation (SSC), which is 
established on solidarity, shared experiences and autonomy of the South.
143
  
In this regard, it is interesting to note that the structure of BRICS countries is not based on the 
framework of organisations, such as, the WTO or the EU, which are probably the most 
democratic and most formal of all the international institutions with a global mandate. The 
BRICS country framework is based on economic weight, geographical position of each 
country, and population.
144
  Furthermore, the BRICS framework is progressively 
characterised by the practice of non-institutionalised mechanisms of global governance and 
network based diplomacy, as well as the growing economic interdependence of states.
145
 The 
BRICS countries are principally playing a lobbying role which is not recognised at the 
international level as a formal international institution. For example, the consensus principle 
and the principle of one-member one vote which are recognised in the WTO system are not 
applicable in the BRICS countries. Although the consensus principle and the principle of one 
member one vote are not the only way to be a formal institution, they are, however, an 
example for the new groups who flourish in the multilateral trading system. Therefore, the 
role of BRICS countries could become more important in the multilateral trading system, not 
as individual members but as a coalition group if the group sets a framework based on 
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fundamental principles, such as, the democratic principle, the consensus principle and the 
transparency principle.  
3.6.1 The role of the BRICS group in the multilateral trading system 
 
For over 50 years the multilateral trading regime was dominated by rich countries, such as, 
the US, the EU countries, and Japan, under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).
146
 The Marrakech Agreements introduced the concept of trade liberalisation in the 
global economy, significantly impacting on developing countries in the multilateral trading 
system. Following this period, developing countries, such as, the BRICS countries, have 
sought to play an important role in the multilateral trading system. The role of the BRICS 
countries in the multilateral trading system as new emergent countries has expanded and 
progressed to the formulation of common approaches to crucial issues on the international 
agenda.
147
 They have thus achieved important gains in the multilateral trading system during 
the last few years. 
 During 2011-2013, BRICS economies marked an average growth rate of 4.11 per cent, as 
compared to the 1.3 per cent average growth rate of developed countries. This shows that the 
BRICS countries remain a significant dynamic force of the multilateral trading system and 
that their role in the global economy, including all the G20 economies, continues to grow. In 
future years, this trend is expected to continue, as growth is forecast to remain above 10 per 
cent, far outperforming that of the developed world.
 148
 The BRICS countries are deeply 
committed thereto, and are influential members of the WTO.
149
 Over the last few years, the 
BRICS countries have had more positive economic changes than other IGOs, such as the 
EU.
150
 For example, when looking at the extent of nominal economic size between BRICS 
countries, the multiple for Brazil is over 4 times, India 5 five times, China over 14 times, and 
South Africa by over 4 times of Gross domestic product (GDP). Furthermore, the position of 
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this group will progress in term of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) criterion.
151
 According 
to Melchior the economies of BRICS countries will continue to growth by 2030 in the future 
multilateral trading system particularly China which presents a fast growth annual GDP.
152
 
With the incredible growth of the BRICS group in the multilateral trading system, China has 
appeared as the second world largest economy, followed by Brazil in fifth position, Russia in 
eighth and India in tenth.
153
 This significant growth trend in GDP reflected the important 
place of BRICS countries in the further development of the multilateral trading system. 
According to Narlikar, it is an important indicator of the motivations driving growing powers 
and the impact that they might have on the balance of power as well as the norms that 
underlie the system.
154
 
Additionally, the place of BRICS in the multilateral trading system has become more 
important in terms of donations and participation at the G20 summit and at the WTO 
negotiations.
155
 These have given in complex changes about the potential and importance of 
BRICS in reforming the international trade order.
156
  Co-ordination and co-operation 
constitute valuable considerations in the BRICS Group on issues of common interest. BRICS 
countries have enabled the evolution of convergence positions on many global issues, such 
as, reform of the international financial system, the WTO, support for a democratic and 
multi-polar world order, and many regional and political issues.
157
 
BRICS countries have also successfully supplemented this balancing process as a state 
coalition, in particular in comparison with other international co-operation efforts relating to 
the multilateral trading system.
158
 Similarly, BRICS countries have been an important part of 
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the proactive role of developing countries in renovating the dynamics of the WTO.
159
 This 
has been particularly visible in three critical negotiating areas in the going on WTO Doha 
Round of negotiations, viz, the patent regime and access to medicines, agriculture, and non-
agricultural market access. For a good understanding of the G Group and IGOs in the 
multilateral trading system with regard to the WTO, this chapter will try to outline the 
historical evolution of the G group and IGOs in global trade. However, although each 
organisation has it specific rules, some of the organisations apply WTO rules because the 
countries belong to the WTO, for example, the Cotton Four, NAMA11, the G20 Cairns 
group, Least Developing Countries Groups, (LDCs) and BRICS Group.  
3.7 BRICS and the G20 
 
The Declaration by the BRICS countries in Brazil on 15 April 2010 has had an influence on 
the international trading system. The objectives of this Declaration were to discuss the main 
questions on the international agenda with regard to trade and multilateral trading system 
reform, as well as to concretise steps to move forward the co-operation and co-ordination 
among BRICS member states. The leaders of the BRICS countries have solicited the support 
of G20 members for voting power reform of the Bretton Woods institutions at the next G20 
summit. Paragraph 11 of the Declaration states as follows:  
„We will strive to achieve an ambitious conclusion to the ongoing and long overdue reforms 
of the Bretton Woods institutions. The IMF and the World Bank urgently need to address 
their legitimacy deficits. Reforming these institutions' governance structures require first and 
foremost a substantial shift in voting power in favour of emerging market economies and 
developing countries to bring their participation in decision making in line with their relative 
weight in the world economy. We call for the voting power reform of the World Bank to be 
fulfilled in the upcoming Spring Meetings, and expect the quota reform of the IMF to be 
concluded by the G-20 Summit in November this year. We do also agree on the need for an 
open and merit based selection method, irrespective of nationality, for the heading positions 
of the IMF and the World Bank. Moreover, staff of these institutions needs to better reflect 
the diversity of their membership. There is a special need to increase participation of 
developing countries. The international community must deliver a result worthy of the 
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expectations we all share for these institutions within the agreed timeframe or run the risk of 
seeing them fade into obsolescence.‟160 
With regard to this Declaration, the collective pressures exerted by BRICS member states to 
undertake greater regulatory and representational reform in the multilateral trading system 
have seen a significant impact.
161
  Hence, some improvement in economic co-operation and 
reform has been seen in the G20, such as, the systematic review of members‟ macro-
economic and financial policies to involve developed and developing economies.
162
  
Additionally, at a planning meeting of the G20 in March 2009 at Horsham, England, BRICS 
countries called on developed countries, mainly the US and the EU countries, to improve 
information sharing and demanded a bigger role in guiding the IMF. Similarly, the joint 
statement called for significantly more resources for, and more voting weight in, the IMF: 
 „We call for urgent action with regard to voice and representation in the IMF, in order that 
they better reflect their real economic weights. In the Fund, a significant realignment of quota 
should be completed not later than January 2011. This is necessary to enable members more 
equitable and fuller participation in the Fund‟s efforts to play its mandate role. A rebalancing 
of representation on the Executive Board and DVIFC would lead to a more equitable 
representation of the membership. 
163
 
Underlying the position of the BRICS countries regarding the economic order, at the Third 
G20 Summit in 2009 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, US, the final statement said that the leaders 
had agreed to launch a framework that would correspond with policies that will generate 
strong sustainable and balanced global growth.
164
 Also, at the G20 meeting held in Toronto in 
November 2010, the impact of this call for institutional reform has also been taken into 
account by the leaders of the G20. They committed to a change in quota share to dynamic 
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emerging market and developing countries of at least five per cent from more represented to 
under-represented countries using the current IMF quota method.
165
 
Following this summit, in New Delhi in 2012, BRICS leaders have also adopted the same 
position regarding global institutional reform.
166
 The Declaration of New Delhi was focused 
on all pertinent issues ranging from the Eurozone crisis to sustainable development and the 
G20. The BRICS members held an informal meeting ahead of the G20 Summit in St. 
Petersburg on 5 September 2013 to create equilibrium in the international market system.
167
 
However, the 2010 Declaration of BRICS countries was not to create the supremacy of the 
BRICS countries among the G20 group but to make a statement in relation to the reality of 
the need to reform Bretton Woods institutions in respect of WTO principles for further 
economic development.  Although the position of the G20 does not always correspond to the 
BRICS countries agreements, they have a common point in respect of development agendas, 
such as, the reform of the multilateral trading system.
168
  
The value function is magnified by the fact that until 2013 there was only an indirect 
institutional connection between the G20 and the BRICS countries, with no explicit mention 
of BRICS by the G20.
169
 BRICS leaders have consulted together in Cannes before the 2011 
G-20 summits, among speculation that there would be a BRICS bailout fund for peripheral 
European nations. This sounding was continued in 2012 at Los Cabos, Mexico, with BRICS 
leaders issuing a statement that addressed most of the key issues at the G20 summit, with a 
focus on the euro crisis. 
However, the position of BRICS as group of countries is not totally effective within the G20. 
BRICS countries are present in the G20 not as a group, but as individual developing 
countries. Countries, such as, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, are significant in 
the G20 regarding their economic growth and their participation in the multilateral trading 
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system.
170
 The BRICS countries have had a few successes in the G20; however, this has been 
together with other emerging countries group, and the fact that there is no exclusivity 
regarding their achievements has constituted a limit to them.
171
  
3.8 BRICS position at the World Trade Organisation Doha Round 
 
The main point of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) was agriculture with regard to 
market access.
172
 The position of BRICS countries at the WTO Doha Round as 
representatives of developing countries was significant in that each BRICS member has 
defended the common points relating to agriculture and market access for developing 
countries.
173
 To maintain their commitment towards the successful conclusion of the Doha 
Round, continual efforts were made by the BRICS countries. All of those efforts were made 
with respect to their promise for the success of the Doha Round.  
The position of the BRICS countries has also been successfully demonstrated by their 
aptitude for alliance through the agriculture coalition of the G20 group where they supported 
the C4 Group, and on the NAMA 11 Group.174 
The discussions on agriculture were for many the litmus test of the Hong Kong 
Conference.
175
 The Hong Kong Conference was to talk on the issues to help developing 
countries in the multilateral trading system and discuss the fairness of an unequal multilateral 
trading system for the world. The agreement that was reached provides that developed 
countries grant duty free quotas to the LDCs until the end the negotiations of the Doha 
Round.
176
 The text on agriculture also provided for faster and more determined cuts in 
domestic production of cotton with trade distortion effect than those that have been obtained 
within the framework of the general formula applicable to domestic subsidies to 
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agriculture.
177
 It was in the G20 press release that the most explicit references to, and the 
more assertive support for, cotton have been found.
178
  
Indeed, BRICS countries at the G20 summit demanded a reduction of subsidies lower than 
those proposed by the President of the agriculture negotiations, Crawford Falconer, and strict 
discipline to avoid an uncontrolled transfer between clubs within a general range.
179
 This 
effectively makes up the influence of developing countries in trade negotiations regarding the 
domestic subsidies to agriculture, especially on cotton.  The G20 also stated that cotton must 
be treated in accordance with the Hong Kong commitments to trade and development aspects 
on the basis of proposals submitted by the C4 group. According to the then Director General 
of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, cotton remained one of the litmus tests of the content 
development of the Doha Round; therefore, the Doha Round could not be achieved without 
the inclusion of cotton negotiation. He reiterated the mandate for the achievement, of an 
expeditious and specific outcome for cotton through the three pillars of the negotiations on 
agriculture (export competition, domestic support, and market access).
180
  
However, another group, the  NAMA-11
181
 was also one of the principal parties at the WTO 
Doha Round negotiations, with the G20 coalition of developing countries which was formed 
at the Doha Round on industrial tariffs.
182
  
3.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a schematic overview of the formation and evolution of IGOs in 
general, and thereafter the emphasis was placed principally on the G Group BRICS, C4 
Group and NAMA-11 Group in the multilateral trading system. It has also indicated their 
importance in the multilateral trading system as major instruments for reform and for support 
for developing countries in the WTO Doha Round. With the development of the G20 
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meetings, the old Outreach 5 with its unequal and ad hoc character has lost its active impact 
on the multilateral trading system. The meeting of BRICS was initiated to create a new 
environment for emerging powers to work together as a group of rising powers that are both 
willing and able to play a collective role in the multilateral trading system. The common idea 
pursued by BRICS countries was to seek a new international trade and economic order built 
on the principles of the WTO system, justice, fairness, and democracy.
183
  
As recent influential members of the current international trading system, BRICS countries 
wish to increase their voice in the global governance structure to reflect their perspectives and 
interests. The Doha Round has been one of the major meetings where BRICS countries have 
raised their power in relation to agriculture, non-agriculture market access and market access. 
They are working together to make global trade structures more representative and effective 
through the WTO and gradual reforms. In this context, the BRICS Group is not intended as a 
counterbalance to the established Western powers but rather seeks to pursue a more 
operational or equal interaction with them to build a better world order for international trade 
with regard to WTO principles, by the decision making process. The role of BRICS countries 
in the further multilateral trading system is discussed more fully in the following chapter  
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CHAPTER 4 
CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL ECONOMY GOVERNANCE AND THE ROLE OF 
BRICS COUNTRIES IN ITS FURTHER DEVELOPMENT  
 
4.1 Institutional reform  
 
As discussed in Section 2.2, the role played by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as a 
major regulatory instrument in global trade is extremely important for integrating nations in 
the multilateral trading system. The WTO has become an important instrument of trade 
negotiation between countries involved in the current global trading system.
184
 The World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also play a considerable role in the global 
economy. Large numbers of developing countries depend on their financial support for 
economic development growth.
185
 However, the policies of these institutions have been seen 
by developing countries as largely guided by the developed countries for their own trade and 
economic interests due to the manner in which WTO members themselves proceed in the 
decision making process.
186
  
Thus, developing countries have demanded the reform of those institutions in order to have a 
democratic balance in the multilateral trading system. This demand has principally been 
made with regard to the Washington Consensus organisations,
187
 the IMF and the World 
Bank; nonetheless, it has also been made in relation to the WTO, the United Nations (UN), 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and the Group of Twenty (G20).
188
 Coalition 
groups, such as, NAMA Group, the C4 Group and the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, 
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India, China and South Africa), have become very strong advocates of global governance 
reform in this recent years.
189  
The initiative of emerging countries, such as the BRICS countries, to take part in the major 
trade negotiations has been a major step for them to push developed countries to play an 
active role in the reform of these institutions. BRICS countries attempt to change the balance 
of power in the market negotiation agreements between developed and developing countries 
to improve their presence in the multilateral trading system.
190
Trade negotiations on 
agriculture at the Doha Round have been most objective in different areas and there has been 
considerable progress made by BRICS countries in the multilateral trading system.
191
 For this 
reason, BRICS countries had expected that their market access prospects would improve if 
they achieved the reform needed in the WTO. The challenges of the multilateral trade 
negotiations by the G20 group have also been significantly relevant for the development of 
WTO discipline. It is important for BRICS countries to be particularly careful in the context 
of the current pressures exerted to launch further development round negotiations in the 
WTO.  
Emerging countries, especially the BRICS countries, present large opportunities as well as do 
developing countries. However, their voice for decision making is still not strong enough.
192
 
It is quite critical to note that developed countries exert pressure on developing countries‟ 
governments from taking effective steps in the decision making process. The instrument for 
this considerable pressure is principally the limitation on participating in the WTO Green 
Room meeting.
193
 Das argues that the Uruguay Round did not achieve the result that in fact 
the major developed countries moved together and gained big concessions from the 
developing countries. He underlines that: 
„Because of extreme pressures exerted by the developed countries, the Uruguay Round ended 
with highly imbalanced results, with the developing countries making most of the concessions 
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and the developed countries hardly making any significant concessions to them. It is by now 
quite clear that the WTO agreements, which came out of the Uruguay Round, are full of 
imbalances, inequities and deficiencies.‟194 
In fact, it seems that since the Uruguay negotiations, despite the demand of developing 
countries for them to be more active in the multilateral trading system decision making 
process, the issue of the decision making process did not give full opportunity to developing 
countries to participate in trade negotiation. Developed countries still use their power bloc to 
take decision in their favour. Even if in practice it seems that the doors are quite open to the 
developing countries, the reality does not look as good.
195
 
Thus, the multilateral trading system negotiations, the processes of the WTO and discussions 
are under the control of a small number of powerful countries, such as, the US, Canada, Japan 
and the European Union (EU). Developing countries and their delegations continue to be 
excluded from the decision making process and not much has been done to level the playing 
fields. The inadequate treatment of transparency issues in the multilateral trading system in 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration has raised the need to reform the WTO via different 
methods.
196
 
Hence, the need to reform these institutions has been one of the most pressing problems 
within global economic governance.
197
 The rationale of further trade liberalisation in the 
context of sustainable development has been examined. The BRICS countries have requested 
more transparency in the WTO and Bretton Woods institutions as regards the decision 
making process.
198
 For example, Brazil and India have set the process going in the 
multilateral negotiations to have an important impact on some global markets, especially in 
the area of information technology for India, and in agriculture for Brazil. The strong 
presence of BRICS countries in the WTO is seen as a challenge to future trade policy 
reform.
199  
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It is largely because of the development concerns of BRICS countries that many of the 
existing WTO Agreements are partially against their interests, and that situation must be 
reformed in order to achieve a real democratic system in the multilateral trading system.
200
 
For example, in the Doha Round agriculture negotiation, many developing countries spoke up 
on how only a few members appear to be dominating the negotiations. Initially, the 
agriculture negotiations were led by the US, the EU, Brazil, India and Australia, and later 
Japan was included to form the G6.
201
 Most of the BRICS and developing countries wanted 
to be more involved in the negotiating process which can be a formidable management 
challenge. BRICS countries need a new form of negotiation which will draw all participants 
to the application of the non-discrimination principle of the WTO.  
Thus, the hopes to reform the multilateral trading system were at the top of the WTO agenda 
after the Seattle Summit. Chapter 2 of this research did not look at the democratic deficit in 
the WTO decision making process and at the possibility of decision making reform. This 
Chapter 4 will in the first section analyse the reform of the WTO decision making process 
demanded by the developing countries, and thereafter analyse the challenges facing the 
BRICS countries. The third section will outline the BRICS member‟s interest in the regional 
and bilateral trade agreements regarding the multilateral trading system. Following this 
section, the chapter outline the economy contribution of the BRICS countries in the 
multilateral trading system. Finally, the last section will outline the conclusion.  
4.2 Trade policy and reforming the WTO decision making process 
 
The WTO is in a sound position to improve the mechanism relating to the decision making 
process and to ensure the application of democratic process principles. As partially discussed 
in Chapter 2
202
 the WTO Agreement makes very democratic provisions with respect to 
decision making, but, the democratic system should be applicable to all WTO members.  
BRICS countries present many opportunities for the multilateral trading system: in fact the 
BRICS countries together hold 26 per cent of the world‟s gross domestic product (GDP) and 
over 40 per cent of the global population. Therefore, institutional reform cannot be without 
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their involvement in the mechanism of the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO decision 
making process.
203
  
The multilateral trading system has been the cause of many breaches of transparency from the 
inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) up to the WTO. The key to 
the apparent failure of the multilateral trading system is the delay of the decision making 
process at the WTO.
204
 However, the Doha Round stalemate signalled a crisis in the WTO. It 
requested broad institutional reforms to the multilateral trading system to address the 
democratic challenges to furthering the multilateral trading system.
205
 But, these requests for 
comprehensive institutional reform have not yet fully achieved the needs of the developing 
countries.  
The BRICS countries have stated their disagreement with the unpredictability and lack of 
transparency of the negotiation process after the Doha Round.
206
 BRICS pursued the 
development of consensus agreements through the negotiation process at the WTO, the IMF 
and the World Bank with regard to the principle of transparency, which is affirmed in Article 
X of the GATT 1994, Article III of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and 
Article 63 of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement. 
Other WTO provisions of agreements of transparency are included in Annex 1A in 
Agreement on agriculture.
207
  
In view of the multilateral trading system, BRICS countries need to be part of the new 
generation of policies of the international institutions. The BRICS countries‟ main concern is 
not just the affirmation of rights, but their implementation in economies; not just the principle 
of democracy, but its introduction in international decision making and its development as a 
participatory perception. Furthermore, the BRICS countries have now increasingly required 
the building of coalitions as the primary means of refining their representation in the WTO.
208
 
The major instigator for engagement by developing countries with BRICS is the expectation 
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that they use pressure for greater changes in the global financial and economic systems. The 
reform of the building of international financial crisis has been a dominant theme across the 
five BRICS Summits held so far, and there is hope that BRICS countries will prove to be a 
force to deal with within the further meetings relating to the global economy.
209
 The policies 
adopted by the BRICS countries are coherent with existing national and international 
agreements in relation to aid, trade, and development. As a result, the pressure of the BRICS 
countries in the WTO has borne fruit with the appointment of the Brazilian Roberto Azevêdo 
as the sixth Director General of the WTO. 
4.2.1 Reforming WTO decision making: consensus procedure reform 
 
The procedural aspect of the WTO decision making process is related to a variety of 
organisational matters, such as, the role of different forms in the process, the mix of formal 
and informal meetings, representation in informal meetings, transparency provisions, and the 
conditions of access of individual members to the procedure of decision making. However, 
consensus is the standard modality of the decision making process.
210
Decision making has 
become more difficult with increasing coalitions among members of the WTO, especially as 
a result of concerns of the developing countries group and as the range of issues tackled by 
the WTO increases. Regarding the consensus reform standard, Hoekman observed that many 
proposals to reform the multilateral negotiation have been made regarding the consensus 
norm. He contends that  
„Consensus is a critical mechanism through which ensure the legitimacy of the organisation 
and the support that is needed in the domestic politics of members. Developing countries in 
particular are strong supporters of the consensus practice as it provides them with some 
assurance that they will not be confronted with decision that may detrimental to their 
interests.‟211 
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Bilateral and multilateral regional arrangements are also seen as an attempt to address these 
complications.
212
 It is also important to emphasise that due to the lack of democratic process 
in the WTO and the lack of real proposals for restructuring the WTO, a movement towards 
increasing preferential trade agreement (PTA) alliances and an explosion of regionalism have 
been notable in the multilateral trading system.
213
 However, the consensus process in the 
WTO Agreement does not in any way bind members to have recourse to decision making 
solely by consensus. Article IX (1) states: „The WTO shall continue the practice of decision 
making by consensus followed under GATT 1947.‟214 The decision making rule is a simple 
majority vote if there is an initial failure to obtain complete consensus on the matter, 
excepting specific situations where the WTO Agreement requires otherwise.
215
 
The desire of the BRICS countries to be more involved in decision making that affects 
developing countries has been raised. Therefore, the question arises as to how to reform the 
multilateral trading system so that it will include developing countries in the WTO decision 
making process, opposing current policies, and proposing other solutions to global economic 
questions. These are challenges facing BRICS countries‟ efforts to modify the multilateral 
trading system made of decision making. It is therefore interesting to understand why the 
consensus rule should require modification.  
It is worthwhile to note that the principle of consensus in the WTO decision making reform 
became important in the Doha Development Agenda. Developing countries and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have found that the consensus process is an 
undemocratic aspect of the multilateral trading system.
216
 Bello argues that the principal 
reason for the failure of the Seattle Summit was the absence of transparent decision making. 
He contends: „Consensus, WTO style means the big trading countries impose their consensus 
on the less powerful countries.‟217 Additionally, according to Ansong, the use of consensus 
presents some significant problems for the WTO‟s decision making system.218 The arguments 
advanced by these authors explain the limited use of the consensus decision making 
                                                          
212
 Patel M „New face in the Green room developing countries and decision making bin the WTO‟ (2007) 
Working Paper 19. 
213
 Chapter 2.4.2 
214
 Article IX: 1 of the WTO Agreement. 
215
 Saurombe A & Nkabinda H „Reforming the multilateral decision making mechanism of the WTO: what is 
the role of emerging economies?‟ (2013) (16) 5 Potchefstroom electronic law journal. 
216
 Bello W „Lack of Transparency in the WTO‟ (2002) Development Dialogue 117 118. 
217
 Bello W (2002) 119. 
218
 Ansong A „The WTO decision-making process: Problems and Possible Solutions‟ (2012) Working Paper 17. 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
procedure in the WTO due to the heterogeneity of trade interests. It appears that despite the 
strong voice of the BRICS countries in the multilateral trading system, the consensus decision 
making method restricts them from using their numerical advantage to order the direction of 
WTO policy. There is no equality between members in the consensus decision making 
process and the principles of reciprocity of advantage are not applicable to WTO members. 
This is due to the fact that all members have never been involved in the consensus, and major 
developing countries are ignored by developed countries during trade negotiations. 
Regarding the ability of emerging countries in the multilateral trading system to influence the 
policy order of the WTO, the voice of the BRICS countries has grown.
219
 However, the 
consensus process does not give them a possibility to use that advantage to be part of the 
decision making in the multilateral trading system. It seems that developed countries have 
found the consensus method easier to influence voting outcomes. It involves negotiations and 
consultations to ensure agreement before voting. Consensus decision making is generally 
regarded as having better democratic legitimacy than majority decisions. Any member 
present during the decision making can block a decision by simple objection. Nevertheless, it 
was observed by Bossche that, where an overwhelming majority are in favour of a decision 
with only one or a few objecting, it presents a problem in that progress can be blocked by a 
small number. One proposition for dealing with this is critical form perception.
220
 In 
accordance with this, where the majority are in favour of a decision, the few objecting 
members should abstain from blocking progress.
221
 Additionally, Hoekman made an 
interesting comment which points out the condition for consensus to have the purported 
benefits: 
„A necessary condition for consensus to have the purported benefits is that there is informed 
participation. In practice, small countries confront serious information and resource 
constraints that impede effective participation. This can have costs, both in an opportunity 
forgone sense and in a direct sense if countries agree (or do not object) to initiatives that have 
adverse consequences for them.‟222 
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The critical question in decision making reform is whether single large WTO members need 
to retain their influence to work within the institution by blocking the adoption of a particular 
decision. Blocking a decision comes at an international political cost and may no longer be an 
attractive option for the international trade market. The coalition group at the WTO is a 
necessary condition for successful decision making, and blocking might in this instance be 
seen as its only option in order to be understood in the multilateral trading system with a view 
to achieving successful economic growth.
223
 It seems that, despite the better way given by 
voting to advance multilateral co-operation on trade, the WOT principle of voting does give 
the possibility of developing countries to use their vote effectively. In fact, it is difficult for 
developing countries, which have partially participated in WTO negotiations, to use their 
votes at the final stage.  As a result of this asymmetry, trade agreements will tend to reflect 
the concerns of developed countries. The method of coalition groups, such as, BRICS, C4 
and NAMA 11, was to have more power in the WTO decision making process because a 
single country could not do so, in their own interest.  
It is important to note that negotiated as fundamental trade agreements could thus be 
formalised with consensus rules by adopting a system of weighted voting. In fact, formal 
voting on the basis of equal sovereignty and an equal voting obligation has not totally taken 
place with regard to rule making in the WTO.
224
 However, sovereignty responds only 
partially to existing power relations. Voting rights could be achieved via transparency if a 
manner is established that suitably reflects the relative importance of the WTO member 
within the multilateral trade system. In view of multilateral transparency, it is noted that the 
alleged democratic legitimacy of consensus is only formal and does not offer a true and 
transparent account of power relations. 
4.2.2 The Single Undertaking reform  
 
As the developing country group has become more structured, the informal configuration of 
the Single Undertaking requirement in the WTO has also gradually changed.
225
 The Single 
Undertaking is the concept of a WTO decision making process which requires compliance 
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with the principle that if the rule is binding on all then the rule must be agreed to by all.
226
  
Since the multilateral trading system binds all WTO members, the Single Undertaking has an 
intensifying effect on the decision making process. Without the Single Undertaking, trade 
issues would be negotiated in storage fortification; and countries with only defensive interests 
would have no motivation to negotiate.
227
In order to make it a larger part of consensus 
decision making, the Single Undertaking requirement would also have to be important in a 
way that makes it less strict. On the other hand, the meaning of the Single Undertaking is also 
that countries wanting to become members of the WTO have to accept the complete 
agreement package of the Uruguay Round as well as the supplementary obligations, without 
exception.
228
 
The Single Undertaking procedure in the WTO has a fundamental significance with respect 
to an aptitude to influence the decision making process. The purpose of the Single 
Undertaking procedure was to facilitate trade negotiation through safeguarding countries, and 
to suggest concessions between the countries involved on the basis of their interests which 
will thus maintain an enthusiasm for trade negotiations and trade liberalisation.
229
 Reforming 
the WTO decision making process via the Single Undertaking has procedure been most 
significant for developing countries of the WTO.
230
 For many developing countries, the 
Single Undertaking promises them sustainability of more trade obligations then previously 
required under the GATT.
231
 It helps them to meet key objective of the Uruguay Round and 
the WTO rules which involve the developing countries in the multilateral trading system. 
With this reform, more trade liberalisation has been committed by developing countries in the 
Uruguay Round negotiations than by developed country partners.
232
 The rise of the BRICS 
countries offers several new opportunities for the trading system, but also poses serious and 
surprising challenges. 
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4.3 The challenges facing BRICS countries in the multilateral trading system  
 
The challenges to the multilateral trading system order should include proposals and options 
for WTO decision making reform. The world is multi-polar and state sovereignty is one of its 
important features for the international trade system.  According to Dube, the proposed 
reform of the WTO decision making process has different contexts with regard to the current 
four main principles of decision making in the WTO: 
 The WTO is a one member one vote organisation, thereby allowing equal status to all 
members irrespective of their trade shares or economic size. 
 The WTO is a member driven organisation. 
 Consensus based decision making is the de facto norm in the WTO. 
 The WTO relies on an elaborate network of informal processes to get to a 
consensus.
233
 
The position of developing countries, mostly BRICS countries, to be proactive in the WTO 
decision making process, has been seen as a challenging step for them to take the initiative to 
correct the current situation. Thus, the BRICS countries have co-ordinated their actions and 
prepared well for the WTO negotiations.
234
 The disappointment of the Doha Round has 
caused developing countries to be proactive in the multilateral trading system which has been 
criticised by developing countries in terms of democratic and transparent governance. The 
main theme is: BRICS countries have first developed their economies by preferential trade 
agreements in their specific areas which has resulted in an important convergence of income 
levels between the poorer and the richer countries of the world. They then created the 
coalition to be more consistent in WTO decision making. Finally, BRICS countries have 
items for the future of the development trade agenda. The BRICS countries demand reform of 
international institutions related to trade, such as, the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank 
which they see as obsolete.
235
 Therefore, the challenges facing BRICS countries are primarily 
reforming the multilateral trading system and increasing the BRICS impact in the world 
market. However, it will be difficult for the BRICS countries to achieve these objectives 
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without a political consensus among them, which has limited their impact on the international 
scene. This is patently true since all BRICS countries have their own national interests, and 
there are often conflicts of interest among them despite the cohesion between them.
236
 China 
is the largest single buyer or seller in many markets; and India and China are often in 
disaccord regarding trade interests in Asia. However, despite this conflict of interest, the 
pressure on the BRICS countries to face the new challenges resolutely has continued, and has 
got their proposal included in the negotiations.
237
  
This significant achievement has given them the possibility to adopt a position in the current 
global economy to make more transparency, reciprocity and sovereignty part of the WTO 
order. On the positive side, there is a consciousness that this movement could help take 
forward the long-held ideal of an alternative discourse that puts the global South in a position 
of leadership and creates the possibility for South-South partnerships in trade, aid and 
development. Also, there is the expectation that the BRICS countries will have a greater 
impact role on the issues of development, including inequality in the global economy; in fact, 
they are building their economic power on the lessons learnt from the challenges facing 
them.
238
  
Desai observes that the challenges of the BRICS countries come into their own challenges 
among them. He argues: 
„The interests of BRICS members seem to diverge in several areas. But the group gains 
cohesive force from its challenge to the influence of the North Atlantic community and its 
ally Japan in which it stands a good chance of success.‟ 239  
If BRICS is compared to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) as a group of countries, the BRICS countries can be considered as relatively 
consistent countries when it comes to the international EU and Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) agenda. In fact they have created an institutional framework to represent 
their collective interests in similar ways as development co-operation groups.
240
 Also, they 
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currently raise a common voice at the multilateral trading system level by having many 
summits relating to the multilateral trading system. Thus the challenges in the multilateral 
trading system can be significant without any framework. The following section will try to 
underline the BRICS Agenda for global governance.   
4.3.1 BRICS Agenda for global governance 
 
The Agenda of BRICS countries for establishing strategy reforms for their engagement in the 
multilateral trading system is the route of future financial trade co-operation.
241
 The creation 
of such trade co-operation can provide an alternative response to global and regional 
development challenges, and co-ordinated action on issues, such as, food security, protection 
of bio-diversity, health, and urbanisation.
242
 This Agenda also includes a call for changes in 
the voting power and quota structures of the World Bank and the IMF, the obligation to study 
local currency trade settlement negotiation between member countries, and the creation of a 
BRICS Bank.
243
 Thus the Brasilia statement at the 2010 Summit outlines the specific changes 
proposed by BRICS countries for the multilateral trading system including the voting power 
reforms in the World Bank. 
Marianne Goldman underlines that Mashabane, South African Minister of International 
Relations and Co-operation, hoped that BRICS would push for greater changes in the global 
financial and economic system. According to Mashabane: 
„BRICS members are still talking about the overall and overarching vision. South Africa 
believes that we are there at the right time to make a kind of influence and make sure that 
BRICS doesn't just focus on big governments, big economies, but also looks at softer issues 
on how to make sure that ordinary people benefit and can also take ownership of BRICS.‟244 
It is argued that the actions of BRICS countries are mainly focused on more South-South 
trade co-operation.
245
  The significance of the concrete Agenda of BRICS countries is its 
position on the BRICS Summit declaration with regard to the multilateral trading system. In 
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this regard, BRICS countries have emphasised the need for their effective and full 
participation in the decision making processes in the multilateral trading system. 
Economically, the BRICS countries have taken large shares of global trade; and politically, 
their growing voice in the WTO is reshaping at least some of the rules of the game. The three 
last BRICS Summits (Sanya, New Delhi and Durban) saw the reinforced call for reforms in 
international financial institutions, including a push to open principal places in the IMF and 
the World Bank to candidates from outside the US and the OECD bloc. The dialogue on 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR) within the international monetary system was also on that 
agenda. India is committed to the consolidation of the BRICS co-operation framework. The 
BRICS Delhi Action Plan, annexed to the Delhi Declaration issued by the heads of States at 
the fourth Summit in New Delhi in March 2012, laid down the broad contours of co-
operation under India's chairmanship of BRICS. It provided an enabling framework for co-
operation in identified areas. Also, at the Durban Summit, held on 26-27 March 2013, the 
leaders made an important point relating to the multilateral trading system to exploit 
opportunities created by the ongoing global power change which should reflect the growing 
weight of their economies in the changing global system.  
The BRICS Agenda for further challenges to the multilateral trading system has brought a 
new shape to the global economy.
246
 It is becoming increasingly multipolar with the 
emergence of these five countries. Thus, the decision to create a BRICS Bank has engendered 
eagerness across the global South as a step forward in creating a multilateral development 
bank to facilitate co-operation in this area and set up infrastructure funds to organise trade 
and institutional investors, as well as encourage public and private participation in the 
infrastructure drive.
247
 The BRICS Bank would be expected to fund development and 
infrastructure projects in developing countries; promote sustainable development; facilitate 
increased trade and trading opportunities; and offer support to the social development sectors 
without the political forces of the US and Europe funded financial institutions. Currently, 
BRICS countries‟ success in the global economy is a key driver of their recent economic 
dynamism and growing economic power; in fact, Brazil, India and China have major 
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opportunity trading interests in the WTO, the IFM and the World Bank.
248
 The next section 
will outline the support of BRICS countries for multilateral and regional trade agreements 
with regard to the development and share principle of the WTO. 
4.4 BRICS and multilateral and regional trade agreements  
 
The particularity of the BRICS countries is that they act as regional economic leaders in their 
respective regions and are all members of major international and multilateral institutions, 
such as, the WTO, the United Nations (UN), the G20, and the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). They also are able to access many regional trade agreement 
bodies, such as, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC), the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), India and China as members of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), Brazil as 
member of Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), the African Union (AU), the South 
African Development Community (SADC), the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC), and the Association of South East Asian Nations(ASEAN).
249
  
A number of trade agreements are also in the pipeline, with the initiation of negotiations 
between China and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and India and the 
SACU.
250
 Additionally, both India and China are members of Asia Pacific Trade Agreement 
(APTA). Also, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) try to develop trade between developing 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Negotiations on a Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement (RCEP) are also on the same road. India and Brazil are party to the 
Agreement on the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP) 
which seeks to promote trade amongst the G 77.
251
 All of these agreements amongst BRICS 
countries show the significance of these five emerging countries in the multilateral trading 
system with regard to the development principle of the WTO. According to Reddy, former 
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Governor, Reserve Bank of India, the presence of BRICS countries in different regional trade 
agreements gives them better economic power in the multilateral trading system. He 
underlines that: 
„… BRICS is more representative of the diversity in the global economy than any other 
group. The BRICS voice is certain to carry greater weight than any other group in echoing 
global concerns because it is a miniature version of global diversity and global concerns, be 
they poverty or climate change.‟252 
The choice to build co-operation and regional trade agreements has come for this group as an 
important step to minimise the economic and political variances within the group which will 
develop intra-trade co-operation among BRICS countries.
253
  
However, BRICS members have also individually developed trading relationships with the 
EU. For example, the EU-South Africa Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement 
(TDCA) signed in Pretoria on 11 October 1999. The Agreement covers five areas of co-
operation: political dialogue, development co-operation, co-operation in trade and trade 
related areas, economic co-operation and co-operation in other areas. The TDCA establishes 
preferential trade arrangements between the EU and South Africa, along with the progressive 
introduction of a free trade area. The TDCA's trade related Articles have been provisionally 
applied since January 2000. This Agreement fully entered into force on 1 May 2004 after 
ratification by all signatory parties. Trade between the EU and South Africa is governed by 
the TDCA. EU China trade co-operation has also affirmed the determination to boost trade 
investment and economic issues. Both parties have negotiated and concluded a broad China-
EU Investment Agreement regarding the issues of interest to either side, including investment 
protection and market access.
254
  The EU is also the largest trading partner in Russia and 
Russia is the third largest trading partner of the EU.  The EU trade co-operation with India it 
is also important for sustainable growth. EU is the main trading partner of trade in goods and 
services in India. This co-operation constitutes a real opportunity for both parties in term of 
innovation and job creation. Also, the EU and Brazil trade agreement relationship shows the 
importance of developing countries to be part of trade negotiations.  Brazil is the largest 
trading partner in Latin America and its trade with the EU accounts for 37 per cent of the 
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EU's total trade with the Latin American region (2012).  The largest trading partner of Brazil 
is the EU, and Brazil is the EU‟s eighth largest trading partner, accounting for 2.2 per cent of 
total EU trade (2012).
255
. Additionally, the recent summit between the EU and Brazil has 
shown the significance of a trade relationship between developed countries and developing 
countries in the multilateral trading system. Intra-BRICS trade has also been developed by 
BRICS members, even if it is not very high yet. The subsequent section will discuss the 
mutual co-operation among BRICS countries. 
4.4.1 Mutual trade co-operation  
 
The platforms of co-operation and dispute led by BRICS countries are currently some of the 
major influences with regard to the future challenges that they want to meet in the 
multilateral trading system. The purpose of building co-operation among them was to share 
management and technical capacities, promote trade and tourism, and facilitate cultural and 
educational exchanges.  
Trade is one of the most important indicators of how co-operation between the BRICS 
countries is evolving. It appears to have played a significant role in boosting the economic 
growth prospects of these countries. There is confirmation that trade co-operation has been 
seen and used as an instrument for promoting economic growth and facilitating development 
in all the BRICS countries.
256
 At their most recent Summit held in Durban, the BRICS 
leaders emphasised the need to build intra-trade co-operation in respect of the respective 
specialties of their economies. The ministers agreed that the current economic situation 
requires new principles, perceptions, models and mechanisms to reinforce intra-BRICS co-
operation. Such co-operation could be achieved by identifying complementarities, and by 
further trade exchange, investment promotion and technical co-operation. China and India are 
concentrating on bilateral aid mainly, while Russia, Brazil and South Africa are mostly using 
multilateral systems, due to their obligations to regional integration. Thus, the graphics below 
clear show intra trade co-operation between BRICS countries. 
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Trade between Brazil and the rest of the BRICS countries  
 
Trade between Russia and the rest of BRICS countries 
 
 
Trade between India and the rest of BRICS countries 
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Trade between China and the rest of BRICS countries 
 
Trade between South Africa and the rest of BRICS countries 
Source: Based on United Nations COMTRADE and http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/(accessed 
30 September 2013). 
It appears that trade co-operation among BRICS countries is dominated by China which has 
at least 72 per cent of their trade. India, Russia and Brazil‟s trade shares are more or less 
equal, but South Africa must be careful not to be overtaken by challengers that seek to turn 
into the African continent‟s economic centres, such as, Nigeria or Kenya, due to their smaller 
trade share with BRICS countries. To better tap their mutual market potential, BRICS 
countries should sign bilateral or multilateral trade and investment facilitation agreements. 
However, it appears that intra-BRICS trade is surprisingly smaller than BRICS trade with the 
African continent. This shows the limit on BRICS trade although manufacturing has been the 
most important area of growth, employment generation and poverty reduction in BRICS 
countries. India and Brazil have also played a significant role in the services area. 
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However, despite this limit, the BRICS countries‟ performance in the multilateral trading 
system has doubled over the past years.
257
 The BRICS countries‟ governments have set up a 
series of initiatives to tackle the problem and find ways to increase trade. The five countries 
have set themselves a target of increasing their bilateral trade to US$ 500 billion by 2015. 
The largest trade partner among the BRICS countries is China with a trade share reaching 
between 72 per cent and 85 per cent in intra-BRICS trade. India has a share ranging between 
8 per cent and 26 per cent in intra-BRICS trade. However, the trade share of Brazil is not 
comparable to other BRICS countries, except China where its share is 30 per cent. Also, 
Russia has a small share of the trade cake in all markets barring China where its share is 28 
per cent. The smallest trade share of BRICS countries is that of South Africa with a trade 
share ranging between zero per cent and 16 per cent.
258
 
The BRICS countries have also established many memoranda of understanding among them 
in their specific areas based on standard evaluation agreement and accreditation procedures. 
These memoranda are considered as preferential trade agreements (PTAs) between the 
BRICS countries. Brazil, for example has, a memorandum of understanding a standardisation 
body with India, namely, the National Institute of Metrology, Normalisation and Industrial 
Quality (INMETRO), and a co-operation agreement with Russia on value management 
systems. Additionally, India and South Africa have a memorandum of understanding on a 
standardisation body, namely, the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS). Furthermore, several 
important agreements have been signed in 2012 at the BRICS Summit, such as, the 
Agreement on Extending Credit Facility in Local Currency and the Multilateral Letter of 
Credit Confirmation Facility Agreement.
259
 BRICS countries have specifically signed an 
agreement on export-import to facilitate co-operation amongst them by means of the 
Brazilian Development Bank, Russia‟s State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign 
Economic Affairs, India‟s Exim Bank, the China Development Bank Corporation, and the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa.
260
 The purpose of these agreements, according to the 
BRICS countries, is to facilitate trade in domestic currencies, which will reduce the use of the 
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US dollar, minimise the risk of currency instability, and thus develop the globalisation of 
BRICS currencies. 
It is also interesting to note that mutual trade co-operation is not limited to the BRICS 
countries. BRICS countries have developed the idea of South-South co-operation mostly with 
the African continent. For example, BRICS leaders have committed themselves to support 
structure development and industrialisation in Africa within the framework of the New 
Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD).261 Such co-operation involves development 
which is focused on energy, transportation and industry. The vision of BRICS countries is to 
find innovative ways to establish the right mechanism in the multilateral trading system to 
enhance trade co-operation. 
4.5 Economic contribution of BRICS countries 
 
The globalisation of the world economy is characterised by the liberalisation of trade and 
investment regimes. The effect of the BRICS countries in the multilateral trading system has 
been greater on the global trading system regarding manufacturing, service trade co-operation 
and investment.
262
 Their influence on the global economy is significant because they have 
stalemate trade relations among themselves. Also, their impact is based on the degree of 
political coherence among them, as well as their capacity to influence the international 
system.
263
 Their improvement in the global economy in the 21st century has impressed the 
world‟s economies.264  
With regards to the BRICS countries‟ improvement, their share of the multilateral trading 
system has been around 18 per cent of the global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010.
265
 
The foreign direct investment (FDI) of these economies has risen from around $80 billion in 
2000, to around $220 billion in 2010, which indicates their increasing significance as 
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destinations for world capital as production sources.
266
 Developing economies absorbed more 
FDI than the developed ones, with four developing economies ranked among the five largest 
recipients in the world. China is the major country of economic contribution though FDI. 
Developing countries also generated almost one-third of global FDI discharges, continuing 
the tendency of cash rich corporations in foreign countries investing in progressive 
economies.
267
  
It is argued that, with the balance of economic power dramatically unstable over the next 
years, China is pre-determined to become the world‟s largest economy, followed by India 
which will overhaul the US.
268
 Development literature views FDI as effecting structural 
transformation and rapid economic growth of BRICS countries. Therefore, the importance of 
BRICS countries among emerging countries is determined by their large receipt of FDI which 
represented around $145 billion in 2012 accounting for 10 per cent of world flows.  For 
example, China‟s economic contribution is around 3.7 per cent. This has been important for 
the development and prosperity of the multilateral trading system in recent years for BRICS 
countries.
269
 In fact, the economic recession has given an opportunity to BRICS countries, 
especially China, as investment destination in the world.
270
 China‟s economic performance 
has become a major force encouraging economic co-operation in the multilateral trading 
system, mostly in Asia and Africa.
271
 It has supplanted the US as the major investor in the 
Republic of Korea and of Japan in 2002. According to the then WTO Director-General, 
Pascal Lamy, China should be more active in global economic governance.
272
 However, 
India‟s interface with the global economy is much less than China‟s with regard to the GDP 
of the global economy. Its contribution in the multilateral trading system is around 2.4 per 
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cent. Additionally, the Brazilian economy is the world‟s seventh largest.273 It is the largest 
recipient of FDI in Latin America, and the US is traditionally the top foreign investor in 
Brazil.
274
  
With strong emerging trade relations with Asia, and cross-border trade within Africa, South 
Africa‟s economic contribution has attracted many capital inflows, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa which is the second fastest growing region in the world.
275
 The most important trade 
investment of BRICS countries is in Africa, so much so that Africa is now the second fastest 
growing continent in the world with huge mineral and agricultural resources, growing 
markets and a young and active population.
276
 The co-operation between Africa and BRICS 
has gained new momentum and generated much interest in recent years. This is because these 
five countries have begun playing an increasingly prominent role in global trade, investment, 
finance and governance. 
The BRICS countries have grown to rank among the top investing countries in Africa. In 
2011, they were among the top 20 investors in Africa; China, India, South Africa were listed 
as fourth, fifth and 17
th
, respectively, in terms of FDI flows; and South Africa, China, India 
and Russia were the fifth, sixth, seventh and 15
th
, respectively, largest holders of FDI 
stocks.
277
 
The engagement of BRICS countries on the African continent provides more opportunities 
and challenges for Africa‟s economy because in macro-economic terms, the most BRICS FDI 
projects in Africa are in the manufacturing and services sectors, which has positive 
consequences for job creation and industrial growth. FDI has been the most important factor 
for these opportunities and economic challenges. Although the US, the EU and Japan still are 
large FDI givers to the Africa continent, it appear that in recent years the major growth in 
FDI to Africa has come from the BRICS countries.
278
 The BRICS countries‟ co-operation 
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with Africa has increased and generated much interest in recent years.
279
 This is due to the 
increasingly prominent role in global trade played by the five countries. 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has highlighted BRICS countries‟ challenges, trade co-operation and 
contribution to the global economy. The chapter first argued that the global economy has 
seen change with the inclusion of developing countries in the multilateral trading system, 
mostly BRICS countries which have demanded via their three last Summits the reform of the 
WTO and Bretton Woods institutions. Secondly, it has been argued that reforming the 
decision making process should take into account the implementation of the LDCs and 
developing countries to make the WTO more democratic for the reason that the non-
democratic processes have led to a proliferation of PTAs. The WTO Doha Round has shown 
its limitation with regard to decision making, as argued by Dube. Thus, if the international 
trade rules take into account reform with regard to the principle of sovereign equality of 
states, all WTO members could participate in decision making without any discrimination, 
although the procedures of decision making are problematic for developed countries. 
Reforming the WTO decision making process will put an obligation on developing countries 
to be more proactive in expressing their trade needs and having these needs represented in 
multilateral rules.  Institutional reform could be built upon the different methods and the 
convenience of a number of decision making approaches.  
The WTO made considerable progress regarding the decision making process. As noted 
above, the decision making reform has been relevant for developing countries to be proactive 
in WTO decision making process. The voices of developing countries especially BRICS 
countries, have grown in the multilateral trading system, as a result of their economic 
contribution to the multilateral trading system. The framework of the BRICS economies‟ 
contribution has differed in terms of direction and economic outcome despites the cohesion 
among them. BRICS countries especially China in term of South-South co-operation have 
create an important economic growth.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides the conclusions from the research as a whole, with a view to 
recommending practical and effective solutions. The chapter contains all the 
recommendations therein to provide a unified proposal on the way forward to the further 
trade development of the global economy regarding the position of developing countries in 
the multilateral trading system.  
5.2 Conclusion 
 
The multilateral trading system is very important in ensuring economic development growth 
of all the countries involved. It is particularly relevant for developing countries which are on 
the way to development. The institutions in charge of this trade development, such as, the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank, provided the legal framework to regulate international trade in terms of a transparent 
and democratic system. It is interesting to note that the developing countries and 
intergovernmental organisations coalition such as, BRICS countries NAMA 11 and C4 Group 
found that the decision making process of those institutions was dominated by a few powerful 
countries.
280
 Thus, to dead with the issue of inadequate participation in the decision making 
process by developing countries in accordance with the democratic system and transparency 
principle of the WTO, the Doha Round of negotiations of WTO members was launched. It 
has provided a decision making reform regarding the new face of the global economy by 
mean of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA).
281
 Although the Round did not achieve all 
the major points of the Agenda, much progress has been made but much still remains to be 
done regarding the consensus principle of the WTO in relation to agriculture, market access 
and services.
282 The absence of negotiation on these matters has given rise to a movement of 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs). It should be noted that these negotiations were directed 
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as part of the result of the Uruguay Round and reflected the view of various participants that 
there had been an incomplete negotiation.
283
 
The role played by the intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), such as, the WTO, the IMF 
and the World Bank is important in the multilateral trading system.
 284
  BRICS countries have 
a practical role in the multilateral trading system reform. This role refers to the norm setting 
processes in the governance of the global economy.
285
 At this stage it is clear that the voice of 
developing countries specifically BRICS countries is seems to become a counterbalance of 
the develop countries in term of decision making process on the world scene with a wider 
economic and political aims.
 286
  
The challenges of BRICS countries, as mentioned in Chapter 4
287
 above, is to promote more 
trade co-operation among themselves and with other developing countries. Mutual trade co-
operation will therefore be a principle mechanism of BRICS countries to facilitate trade 
development. Although it not an easy task for BRICS countries to achieve certain broad level 
economic reforms as well as to reform the global financial system, they demand to be more 
involved in the decision making process, such as that of the WTO, the IMF, and the World 
Bank. This reform is particularly significant to developing countries for the development of 
their economic growth. The broad comparison in term of mutual trade co-operation indicated 
in Chapter 4
288
that BRICS members are engaged to build intra-trade co-operation even if 
trade co-operation among BRICS countries is dominated by China.
289
 
It is apparent from the research that the economic contribution of BRICS countries is 
presently a driving force in their respective regions in particular and in the world. The BRICS 
agenda for the multilateral trading system has led to a change in the method of governance of 
the international economic system.
290
 In addition to improved adherence to international 
agreements, developing countries called for a better framework between international trade 
rules and the legitimate right to a democratic system in the multilateral trading system.
291
 The 
obligation of the WTO and the Bretton Woods institutions‟ members to engage further in 
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negotiations, and a global reform agenda for a global market which should include 
developing countries, are both important for developed and developing countries. The voice 
of BRICS countries regarding their economic weight has changed the nature of negotiation in 
the multilateral trading system.
292
 It will be almost impossible to build the future of the 
multilateral trading system without consulting the opinion of the BRICS countries. Also, their 
economic power in the regional trade agreement and international arenas has had a significant 
impact on the global market.
293
  
The BRICS member countries have not only had impressive growth rates in the past, but also 
have great potential for the future. They have all formulated long-term development 
strategies that require a more just and fair international political and economic governance 
system. The BRICS member countries are looking to co-ordinate efforts to make the 
emerging international system more balanced, equitable and sustainable.
294
 As seen in 
Chapter 3, with regard to the WTO Doha Development Agenda, decision making has been 
inefficient for developing countries to achieve the relevant reform in the multilateral trading 
system. Developed countries should understand that the Doha Round did not achieve a broad 
deal of negotiation due to the non-democratic system and lack of transparency. Thus, to 
achieve a positive development agenda in the future regarding international trade, the impact 
of developing countries, particularly the BRICS countries must be taken into consideration 
due to their current economic power in the multilateral trading system.  
Although a number of reforms have been made in the WTO and the IMF, the debate over 
whether democratic participation of developing countries in the WTO decision making 
process contributes to or weakens and damages the multilateral trading system still remains. 
The principle of reciprocity and one member one vote remain relevant in a theory which 
provides for the equality of all WTO members. However, the reality it quite different: 
developing countries have not been able to defend their interests in the WTO at all.
295
 Thus, 
that there is fairness in the WTO will not provide the possibility for WTO members to rebuild 
the development framework which exists in order to make it more democratic and involve 
more developing countries in the decision making process.  Developing countries, especially 
the BRICS countries, should learn from the mistake made by developed countries in the past. 
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Thus, for a better framework for the future multilateral trading system, BRICS countries 
should have their own Agenda which will reflect a solid framework for trade negotiation 
between States member and provide a consolidated voice on the international scene. 
5.3 Broad recommendations  
 
It is very encouraging that developing countries have taken a position at the recent WTO and 
G20 Summits. The demand of the BRICS countries for the reform of international 
institutions, such as, the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, and for them to be more 
equitable and more democratic in the multilateral trading system, should be encouraged. 
Their aspirations for reinforcing partnerships with emerging markets, including those on the 
African continent, and regional trade in order to strengthen progressive development, are 
their challenges for further development in the multilateral trading system.  
5.3.1 WTO decision making reform  
 
For further development negotiation in the WTO, the interests of the developing countries 
should be taken into consideration as they reflect a potential market in the international trade 
system. Therefore, the WTO should take into account equilibrium in the decision making, 
such as: 
 Democracy and reform will have consequences for the possibility of negotiations that 
are possible at any one time. In deciding the opportunity for negotiations, and their 
eventual taking place, WTO members should ensure a balance between the interests 
of countries. 
 Information should be provided to delegations giving them an in depth report and 
analysis of discussions at WTO meetings to improve their understanding of 
transparency. 
 To participate effectively in the multilateral trading system without any 
discrimination.  
5.3.2 BRICS reforms 
 
Without a legal treaty, IGOs do not have legal status. Therefore, BRICS countries should 
enter into a legal agreement framework to make BRICS a more powerful institution in the 
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multilateral trading system negotiations, such as, that of the European Union (EU) and 
MERCOSUR. BRICS countries, in the interest of further development, should have, a treaty, 
and create formal spaces for dialogue and engagement which will make BRICS a legal 
coalition of countries on the international scene. 
With regard to trade co-operation, BRICS should facilitate greater co-operation, especially in 
respect of goods and services, towards strengthening partnerships for development and 
industrialisation. Furthermore, negotiations should involve the possibility to develop more 
PTAs among them and in their specific areas. In addition, BRICS should reinforce financial 
and development co-operation via the BRICS Development Bank, and create legal 
instruments to deal with instability in the global economy. 
Reforming the institutions of global governance was in the consideration of the G20 summit. 
Enlightened democratic process and transparency in the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank 
should be the objective and present different opportunities for developing countries and 
developed countries. 
The voice of BRICS should strive to increase representation of emerging economies and 
developing countries at multilateral summits. BRICS should actively explore innovative and 
complementary co-operation for sustainable and impartial development. The BRICS 
countries should create a BRICS parliament, like the EU parliament, to increase political co-
operation.  BRICS should continue to collaborate to identify and utilise strategic 
opportunities to advance its objective of reform of global multilateral institutions in order to 
make them more democratic, representative and accountable. 
The diversity in terms of the participation of the BRICS countries should be recognised as 
historic co-operation on the Africa in continent. Although the BRICS countries are seen as 
new financial partners for Africa‟s development, they should use win-win co-operation to 
give African countries opportunities to develop many sectors, such as, industry, services, and 
agriculture. Those opportunities will grow the economies of the Africa continent and make 
them competitive in the multilateral trading system. This should include the pursuit of greater 
co-operation with the African Union, taking into account Africa's priorities, especially 
integration.  
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